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Abbreviations 
BP British Petroleum 
CDIAC Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (U.S. Department of Energy) 
CO2 Carbon dioxide 
FiT Feed-in-tariff 
EU European union 
EU-ETS EU Emissions Trading System 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
IAM Integrated assessment model 
IEA International Energy Agency 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
IRENA International Renewable Energy Agency 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (in the United States) 
RE Renewable energy 
RES Renewable energy sources 
REN21 Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century 
TPES Total primary energy supply 
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme 
VRE Variable renewable energy 
WB World Bank 
WEC World Energy Council 
WEO World Energy Outlook 
WWF World Wildlife Fund 
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Energy terminology  
Energy models: use and combine data from different sources to describe the energy sub-system such as 
energy demand and supply. Energy models can be useful tools in energy planning such as investment plans, 
legislation and regulation. The emergence of many energy models coincided with the need to develop the 
industrial economy, which explains why they follow a positivist approach and the values of modernisation 
and neo-classical economics. Models may also be misused to legitimate political decisions under narrowly 
framed assumptions. Some models struggle to take into account the role of ecological limits or power rela-
tions. Energy models are not neutral, good or bad in themselves, but it is important to identify who benefits 
from the use of a particular energy model. 
Energy scenarios: are used to assess the impacts of different developments under assumptions of cer-
tain outcomes, and are not policy recommendations. Different scenarios can help decision-makers in 
providing a range of scientific evidence. Energy scenarios can be divided into forecasting scenarios that aim 
to minimise uncertainty based on historical data and backcasting scenarios that map future development 
pathways. 
Forecasting: is a commonly used tool in energy scenario-building, and describes a series of events 
from the present state leading to a state of future, following prevailing trends. Energy outlooks based on 
forecasting methodology that are presented to policy-makers typically include a business-as-usual case and 
alternative scenarios. In forecasting scenarios, the concepts of risk and uncertainty have a central role. 
Backcasting: is a strategy tool to determine the most favourable future scenario and to identify what 
are the necessary steps to achieve this preferred future. Energy backcasting is closely policy-oriented as it 
explicitly focuses on policy implications. This makes backcasting useful for the optimisation of energy de-
mand, a goal which can be obscured in the more traditional energy supply and demand models. 
Assumptions: are set by the modeller in making a model. When an energy model is constructed, sev-
eral assumptions have to be made about the scope and the structure of the model. Experience from previ-
ous modelling exercises teaches that all models are somehow “biased” by traditions and preconceived opin-
ions from the model developer, the model user, and also the model client. 
Carbon neutrality: refers to energy scenarios where energy production and consumption are attained 
without carbon-related emissions. Low-carbon energy scenarios aim to depict pathways to this goal. 
Absolute decoupling – relative decoupling: In the context of energy, absolute decoupling refers to a 
situation where economic growth is attained without increases in energy demand. Relative decoupling, in 
turn, implies that economic growth is achieved with greater efficiency of production. 
Lock-in effect: explains why particular economic or energy infrastructure limits the range of available 
energy choices. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has suggested that because of the present rate of 
fossil fuel based energy consumption and infrastructure choices, the world economy is likely to “lock into” 
a minimum of +2°C degrees global warming trajectory already by 2017. 
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EROEI: is the ratio that describes the amount energy that needs to be consumed when energy is pro-
duced (Energy Return on Energy Investment, or Energy Returned on Energy Invested). Because the esti-
mation of EROEI is complicated, experts may make differing EROEI estimations. 
Fossil fuel subsidies: are production or consumption subsidies that lower the cost or price of fossil 
fuel-based energy generation, for instance through financial transfers, taxation or under-pricing. 
Grid parity: refers to a point in time, at which a developing technology produces electricity for a simi-
lar cost as traditional technologies in a selected area. For instance, when the production costs of renewable 
energy become lower, this technology becomes increasingly competitive compared to retail electricity pric-
es, and can even reach grid parity in market comparison. 
Feed-in tariff (FiT): is an established policy mechanism to accelerate and support investments into 
renewable energy technologies. Typically, a feed-in tariff provides renewable energy producers a guaranteed 
grid access, long-term contracts, and a price to match the cost of technology. 
Energy intensity: measures how efficiently a country uses energy by calculating what is the total ener-
gy use per unit of output. Countries vary widely in their energy intensity performance. 
 
 
Units of energy 
Unit of energy 
J 
GJ 
TJ 
EJ 
BTU 
Quad 
kW 
MW 
GW 
TW 
kWh 
MWh 
GWh 
TWh 
toe 
Mtoe 
Joule 
Gigajoule: One billion (109) J 
Terajoule: One trillion (1012) J 
Exajoule: One quadrillion (1015) J  
British thermal unit (1 055 J) 
Quadrillion (1015) BTU; roughly equal to 1 exajoule 
Kilowatt 
Megawatt 
Gigawatt 
Terawatt 
Kilowatt hour 
Megawatt hour (1 000 kWh) 
Gigawatt hour (1 000 MWh) 
Terawatt hour (1 000 GWh) 
Tonne of oil equivalent (approximately 41.9 GJ) 
Million tonnes of oil equivalent 
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FOREWORD 
Produced by Finland Futures Research Centre (FFRC), this report “Energy models and scenarios in the era 
of climate change” has aimed to improve understanding on how energy models and scenarios are used and 
deployed, to explain how dominant scenarios and future forecasts can be challenged, and build capacity for 
the development of alternative energy scenarios. With regard to debates about energy and climate change, 
the report summarizes experiences from past energy policy research in the Mekong region in Southeast 
Asia, Eastern Africa and Nordic countries. This research has received contributions and challenges from 
the Finnish Ministry of Economy and Employment and Ministry of Environment, VTT Technical Research 
Centre of Finland, Finnish Energy Industries, SKM Market Predictor, Greenpeace, and The Finnish Local 
Renewable Energy Association, whom we would especially like to thank for their time and expertise as the 
discussions have served as interesting material. “Access to Sustainable Energy for All” project has received 
funding from EuropeAid of the European Commission. Finally, the report has aimed to capture the sum-
mary of findings gathered during the research, and does not reflect the views of individual organisations. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: ENERGY MODELS AND 
SCENARIOS IN THE ERA OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
In recognition of the climate change challenge, this report has studied how energy models and scenarios 
have been deployed in energy policy in order to contextualise the assumptions that guide public policy-
making to build up the capacity of decision-makers, experts and citizens alike. 
 
Fossil fuel-based energy consumption drives climate change 
Energy represents over 80% of human-caused greenhouse gases. Energy consumption is rising and the 
world energy system is 82-percent reliant on fossil fuels. Investments into the current energy infrastructure 
cause a considerable “lock-in” effect because they bear a long trajectory. The fossil fuel economy plans to 
burn approximately 2 795 Gt of carbon, which is a carbon budget five times too high, if the world aims to 
stay below an average +2°C warming. In the 20th century, energy consumption has not fallen, and only en-
ergy efficiencies have been obtained as a result of technology improvements. In 2011, the support to re-
newable energies stood at USD 88 billion while fossil fuel subsidies were estimated to range from USD 523 
billion to USD 1.9 trillion.  
 
Could energy scenarios of the industrial era undermine a low-carbon en-
ergy future? 
Today, energy models should be understood as representations of the energy sub-system whose functions 
are embedded within a physical reality. The emergence of many energy models in the 1950s largely coincid-
ed with the need to develop the industrial economy. Detailed techno-economic models were only devel-
oped in the early 1970s as a response to the oil crisis. Past research seems to suggest that certain energy 
forecasting scenarios have exaggerated future energy demand, which has justified the construction of large 
energy plants, and in turn lead to overcapacity in industrialised and developing countries (and consequently 
higher carbon emissions levels). The use of historical energy consumption data and forecasting scenarios 
may partially explain why this might have been the case. For such reasons, it is important to recognize that 
assumptions in energy modelling and policy-making always reflect normative choices and judgment on the 
part of the modeller, or the decision-maker. 
 
The 21st century aspires for deliberative and open energy policy to meet 
climate targets 
If the world is to meet the climate change targets, low-carbon energy scenarios and energy models may help 
in the evaluation of future energy options. Past evidence suggests that traditionally, public administration 
has tended to listen established industry actors more closely than small-and-medium-sized enterprises, ad-
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vocacy groups, or communities. An aspiration to openly discuss politics that influence citizens is known as 
the deliberative turn in democracy, and challenges established policy-making institutions at the national and 
international level. In terms of recommendations for climate change mitigation and energy policy, some of 
these institutions may have taken overly conservative stances. A step towards the acceptance of a diversity 
of views in energy policy and energy modelling could be the opening of all assumptions that guide policy-
making and model-making.  
Although scenarios are not policy recommendations, this report also finds that certain energy scenarios 
search pathways that meet the climate targets more determinedly than energy scenarios that tend to favour 
a business-as-usual situation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This briefing report “Energy models and scenarios in the era of climate change” produced by University of 
Turku, Finland Futures Research Centre (FFRC), aims to improve understanding on how energy models 
and scenarios are used and employed. It is hoped that by giving an overview of energy consumption and 
production and the role of energy modelling in energy planning, this report can provide useful insights to 
the readers. In addition, this report may also build up capacity in the development of alternative energy sce-
narios and explain how or why dominant energy scenarios and future forecasts can be challenged. The re-
port has been written for the use of decision-makers, researchers, non-governmental organisations, advoca-
cy groups, activists, or for anyone interested in the issues of energy policy, energy planning or climate 
change. 
Energy cuts across social, economic and security interests as well as climate and environmental con-
cerns. The global energy system is interconnected in terms of import and export of electricity and energy 
commodities such as oil, gas, coal. All such standpoints may be considered as relevant normative factors 
that may guide assumptions when energy models and scenarios are designed. Climate change, though, is 
perhaps the most difficult problem humanity is forced to tackle and demands urgent action (IPCC 2013; 
2007; 2001). By comparing the existing energy infrastructure and the current carbon emissions path, the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) predicted already in its World Energy Outlook 2011 that the world will 
become locked into a trajectory of more than +2°C of global warming by 2017. Because investments into 
energy infrastructure bear a long trajectory, they hold considerable “lock-in” potential. Regardless of this 
fact, almost all influential energy scenarios suggest that in the long-term time horizon, energy consumption 
is likely to increase and the world energy system remains based on fossil fuels (IPCC-SRREN 2011). Find-
ing such stagnancy in the 21st century in scenario building, lack of interdisciplinary discussion and predictive 
capacity is somewhat astonishing.  
This report presents an overview of energy use and climate change, and discusses different approaches 
to energy modelling and scenario-building that have been employed in the past. This report also presents 
three case studies of energy policy and energy modelling, energy forecasts and discusses related problems 
using examples from different continents: Finland in Northern Europe, Thailand in Southeast Asia and 
Kenya in East Africa. These experiences have been chosen to analyse power structures that underpin ener-
gy policy related knowledge production and policy mechanisms in different types of country contexts, 
around the world. The data is based on a literature review and is supported by expert interviews and re-
search experience about contemporary debates.  
This report also discusses observed problems related to energy modelling, scenario-building and energy 
policy. Past research suggests that official energy scenarios have tended to exaggerate future demand 
(Grönfors 1990). Energy forecasts especially in the North, but also in the fast growing economies of the 
South have been used as tools to justify for large, centralized energy plants leading to overcapacity. This has 
made energy scenarios self-fulfilling predictions and extra-capacity on the supply side, which has encour-
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aged over-consumption. Much of energy modelling and scenario-building have been based on an epistemo-
logical foundation of a techno-rationalistic and economically motivated research paradigm. Energy model-
ling research has typically employed macroeconomic modelling and focused on economic and technological 
development. Such research mainly examines cost optimisation in the supply side when the demand is giv-
en, while downplaying the role of ecological, social and political dimensions in energy and economic policy. 
It is useful to understand that country-based energy outlooks and energy scenarios are typically coordi-
nated and commissioned by the ministry in charge of energy policy, conducted in cooperation with state-
affiliated research institutes, and by researchers with particular modelling expertise. Internationally, the an-
nual World Energy Outlook by the Paris-headquartered International Energy Agency (IEA) is perhaps the 
most often-cited global energy outlook. Also major energy companies in oil and gas sectors produce their 
own outlooks such as the BP Energy Outlook by British Petroleum or Shell Energy Scenarios by Royal Dutch 
Shell. Certain other international organisations and research institutions have made contributions to the 
energy debate with their reports, including the Global Environmental Outlook by the United Nations (UN); 
State of the Future by American Council of the United Nations University; and World Energy Scenarios by the 
World Energy Council (WEC). Apart perhaps from the Energy [R]evolutions series produced by Greenpeace, 
non-governmental organisations have less often constructed global or national energy scenarios. 
Certain energy scenarios have not foreseen unprecedented events or anticipated the pace of technology 
change. Recently, a rapid fall in the price of solar energy and an increase in the industry development have 
outpaced past predictions. On the other hand, while certain scenarios have been able to anticipate techno-
logical changes, almost all have failed to address consumption patterns. Some might suggest that policy-
influencing institutions at the highest international level have taken overly conservative stances when it 
comes to the necessity of policy changes to mitigate climate change. Because most energy-related infor-
mation is provided by the industry and the state, evaluating this information is rather challenging for com-
munities, advocacy groups or others concerned with energy choices in the era of climate change. 
In both energy policy and energy-modelling, the role of assumptions cannot be ignored. In policy-
making, normative judgment is exercised by both politicians and civil servants, when they assess and value 
different competing objectives. In scientific practice, assumptions manifest in relation to the worldview and 
theories that underpin energy model-making. In industrialised countries, the so-called top-down energy 
models have tended to adhere to existing production and consumption patterns, which has also shaped as-
sumptions about future energy demand in an influential manner. In developing countries, searching for op-
timal development paths, energy futures and infrastructure are yet to shape. Therefore, alternative energy 
modelling and scenario building could serve as powerful tools that let a broader range of opinions and ex-
pertise to participate in the debate – to avoid the “lock-in” effect.  
In the wake up to the climate change threat, certain low- and no-carbon scenarios have emerged. Al-
ready, backcasting scenarios have helped to illustrate the magnitude of changes that are required in energy 
systems and infrastructure at all levels: local, national, regional and/or international. Bottom-up energy as-
sessments can be used to improve the linkage of energy production and citizens’ energy needs at a local 
level. Opportunities of democratic decision-making in energy policy might also enhance the local ability to 
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reach development goals and targets, when it is known in detail what is needed to eradicate poverty and 
support low-carbon development pathways1. 
The structure of this report is as follows. Chapter 2 presents the global energy system in the context of 
climate change and provides a historical view to the rapid increase of energy consumption. Chapter 3 pre-
sents what energy models and energy scenarios are and how they have evolved to meet certain historical 
needs. The chapter also discusses the advantages and drawbacks of different modelling approaches. Chap-
ter 4 elaborates three country-based case studies – Finland, Thailand and Kenya in sub-Chapters 4.1, 4.2 
and 4.3, respectively – to reflect their energy policy debates in relation to particularities of each country. 
Chapter 5 discusses the role of citizens in energy policy who are concerned of and influenced by energy 
choices. The participation of citizens is a valuable tool in democratic decision-making, and their opinions 
may contradict the ‘facts’ that are captured and represented in the energy models and supposed to aid deci-
sion-making. Finally, the report provides General Conclusions with a list of key messages to capture some 
of the learnings and provide recommendations. 
It is sincerely hoped that this briefing report is able to improve the understanding of all relevant stake-
holders about the need of climate change mitigation and how this concern should be reflected in energy 
modelling and scenario-building and the energy choices made now that will influence generations to come. 
  
                                                     
 
1  For instance the difficulties of the initial stages of the Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS) of the European Un-
ion, or challenges related to UN-led carbon schemes such as REDD+ could likely benefit from a more coherent 
understanding of the interrelations of energy, climate change and what are the economic and social impacts of 
these initiatives. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
Economies across the world are highly dependent on fossil fuel based energy (IPCC-SRREN 2011; Peters 
et al. 2011), after they have been built according to the planning principles of modernisation. What is more, 
energy consumption based on non-renewable resources increases continuously. Between 1973 and 2012 the 
total primary energy supply in the world increased from 6 to 13 Gtoe, which signifies that energy produc-
tion more than doubled in only 40 years (IEA 2013b). In the 2010s, the global energy system is 82-percent 
reliant on fossil fuels – a ratio which has not improved in the past decades. In 2001, mineral fuels such as 
petroleum, coal and natural gas accounted for 89% of the total energy use (Maddison 2005a). Affordable 
crude oil, most of which has been discovered and exploited during the last hundred years, in particular has 
catalysed economic growth. In contrast, in 1820 – only two hundred years ago – 94% of world energy con-
sumption resulted from the use of organic materials (ibid., 15)2 (cf. Figure 2.1). 
 
 
Figure 2.1. World energy consumption 1820-2010 (Tverberg 2012; based on Smil 2010 and BP Statistical 
Data since 1965). 
  
                                                     
 
2  Pre-industrial economies rely relied in biomass as their primary material source. In contrast, between 1900 and 
2005 the extraction of construction materials grew by a factor of 34 (Krausmann et al. 2009). 
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Simultaneously, energy represents over 80% of anthropogenic (human-caused) greenhouse gases3. In 
2011, global CO2 emissions were 31.3 Gt CO2 annually (IEA 2013a; cf. Figure 2.2). McKibben (2012) has 
explained that the fossil-fuel economy plans to burn an amount 2 795 Gt of carbon globally, which is a car-
bon budget five times too high, if the world aims to stay below an average +2°C warming (see also Berners-
Lee and Clark 2013). These estimates are also echoed in the IPCC Fifth Assessment (AR5) report (2013)4. 
Several energy forecasts assume mixed positions in how to reach to this fact: although energy forecasts ex-
pect energy use to increase for decades to come, simultaneously many of them are aware of the necessity of 
sharp reductions in fossil fuel based emissions. As it stands, there is a substantial gap between political am-
bition and practical reality to achieve climate change targets (IEA 2013a; UNEP 2013).  
 
 
Figure 2.2. Trend of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion, 1870-2010 (IEA 2013a, 8) Source - 
CDIAC, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, US Department of Energy, Oak Ridge, Tenn., US. 
 
                                                     
 
3  In 2009, 43% of global CO2 emissions from fuel combustion stemmed from coal, 37% from oil, and 20% from gas 
(IEA 2013a; IEA 2011). In 2011, oil accounted for 33.1% of global energy consumption, and coal for 30.3% - 
which was the highest figure since 1969 and also increased carbon emissions levels (BP 2012b). Yet, coal account-
ed for 44% of the global CO2 emissions because of its heavy carbon content per unit of energy released. 
4  CO2 emissions account for 70 % of the atmospheric global warming potential of greenhouse gases. Other GHGs 
include long-lived gases such as CH4 (20 %), N2O (5 %) and F-gases like HFCs, PFCs and SF6 (5 %) (Rydén 
2010). 
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Box 2.1. Avoiding an “energy Armageddon” 
There remains too much fossil fuels to be consumed to limit global warming (IPCC 2013; see also McKib-
ben 2012). Even with an uptake of unconventional natural gas, the cleanest of fossil fuels, global warming 
will exceed +2°C (IEA 2011, 42). What is more, new oil discoveries and technology improvements are fur-
ther postponing energy companies’ investments into non-emitting energy technologies. Dieter Helm, an 
economist focusing on energy issues, has provided an excellent overview of the market dilemma. According 
to Helm (2011), if increasing coal demand, increase in Middle East production, the increased use of cheap 
unconventional gas, potentially great quantities of unconventional oil in Brazil, Canada and the U.S. are 
combined; supply could keep fossil fuel prices low and renewable and nuclear prices high also in the future. 
Such drivers would hinder the development of renewable energy technologies and supply an abundance of 
fossil fuels into the world energy system. Also, climate change would advance beyond safe limits, with po-
tentially drastic economic and social consequences.  
See also: BP (2012); Helm (2011); IEA (2011); McKibben (2012) 
 
Energy modelling attempts to depict this global landscape. However, making an accurate representation 
needs to account for a multitude of dimensions. One consideration is the “absence of a level playing field”, 
as argued by the REN21 (2013) network. According to different estimates, fossil fuel subsidies ranged from 
USD 523 billion to USD 1.9 trillion in 2011. In turn, support to renewable energy technologies in the same 
year amounted only USD 88 billion (Tagwerker 2014)5. Certain enquiries of a reform of energy subsidies 
have already been conducted, including an IMF report that was published in 2013 (see IMF 2013), and cer-
tain countries have mapped conducted a mapping of those domestic policies that can be perceived as sub-
sidies harmful to the environment. From an economic perspective, yet another consideration is the fact that 
the energy supply side is constrained by an imperfect market. The imperfect cartel of OPEC countries ac-
counts of 40% of current oil production and of about 70% of proven reserves (Fournier et al. 2013). Final-
ly, the role of energy as a geopolitical topic is difficult to ignore: industrialised economies depend on raw 
energy exports from the African and Middle East regions and Russia (cf. Figure 2.3) as well as the manufac-
turing abilities of China and Southeast Asia through the interconnectedness in the world trade system. 
                                                     
 
5  There are different calculation techniques and measures for fossil fuel price and production subsidies globally (See 
also: Tagwerker 2014; UNEP 2011; IEA et al. 2010) 
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Figure 2.3. Energy imports and exports (BP 2012). 
Over the recent years, certain megatrends that have changed the world energy landscape can be high-
lighted. Following the growth of the world economy, the demand of fossil fuel-based energy has rapidly 
increased, as exemplified by the recent increase in coal-based energy production in China (IEA 2013a, 14). 
There also seems to be an increased difficulty to discover conventional oil (Gautier 2008; IEA 2011, 2013). 
But, contrary to past peak oil scenarios, only conventional reserves seem to have peaked6. In turn, it is now 
expected that unconventional reserves such as oil shales and tar sands could supply large quantities of fossil fuels 
to the world energy system (Helm 2011)7. In recent years, unconventional supply that in 2013 already ac-
counted for almost 5% of total oil production, has surged mainly from light tight oil in the United States, 
oil sands in Canada, natural gas liquids, and deepwater production in Brazil (Fournier et al. 2013). Advances 
in drilling technology and other developments are further facilitating further energy extraction from natural 
resources (Malanima 2010).  
Several experts expect the price of oil to remain at high levels in the future compared to the age of easi-
ly accessible oil in the 20th century. A resource pyramid for energy exemplifies the logic of natural resource ex-
                                                     
 
6  According to the International Energy Agency (2013, 447), it has become fashionable to state that the shale gas 
and liquid tight oil (LTO) revolutions in the United States have made the peak oil theory obsolete. IEA explains 
that the basic arguments have not significantly changed. For the purposes of the peak oil argument, the advent of 
technology breakthroughs, including in LTO, may shift the overall peak in time, but not change the conclusion. 
Once the peak is reached, decline inevitably follows rather quickly.  
7  The sufficiency of global resources for both energy production and as materials is difficult to determine because 
new findings naturally increase this figure. The R/P-ratio used by US Geological Survey, measures the sufficiency 
of currently known reserves to production, and according to BP (2012b), in 2012 current coal reserves were suffi-
cient for 112 years of global production, oil reserves for 54.2 years; and natural gas reserves for 63.6 years. 
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ploitation from the energy perspective (cf. Figure 2.4)8. The EROEI figure helps to explain why easily ac-
cessible energy resources such as crude oil demand fewer resources than unconventional oil (and therefore 
are also less costly). In turn, when more difficult resources are harnessed into use, energy production in 
itself demands increasing amounts of energy. Resource extraction tends to raise the amount of energy re-
quired to extract energy and production costs. Furthermore, higher production costs can potentially trans-
fer into energy prices in the world energy market.   
 
 
Figure 2.4. Resource pyramid for energy (Lardelli 2008). 
Because energy demand is increasing as a result of economic growth (Chiou-Wei et al. 2008; Lee and 
Chang 2007), the mitigation of climate change would demand that the use of fossil fuels is decoupled from 
economic activity. Nevertheless, as has been explained in the beginning of this chapter, in the 20th century 
energy consumption did not fall. Instead of the absolute decoupling of energy consumption and economic 
growth (in terms of GDP), only relative decoupling has been achieved (cf. Figure 2.5). Or, to make it more 
clear, technological development has only been able to obtain improvements in energy efficiency (Jackson 
2011). The rebound effect, also known as the Jevons paradox, further complicates matters. The rebound effect 
is an observation, which suggests that even when energy efficiency is achieved in a selected area of econom-
ic activity, savings are typically re-invested into economic activity elsewhere, which as a net effect results in 
increased energy consumption. 
                                                     
 
8  In energy economics, the EROEI-ratio describes the ratio of energy returned on energy invested. 
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Figure 2.5. Absolute and relative decoupling: resource use and GDP (Raworth 2012b). 
Renewable energy and the role of supportive policies 
Despite the climate change urgency and concerns of low access to energy still in many places around the 
world, the share of renewable energies (RE) in the global energy production mix is marginal. Depending on 
what energy sources are included and the used methodology, estimates of the share of RE varies between 
2.1% (BP2012b) and 12.9% (IPCC-SRREN 2011, 9)9. Nevertheless, between 2000 and 2012, the installed 
global renewable electricity capacity doubled from 748 GW to 1,470 GW. This has included an increase of 
wind power generation worldwide by a factor of nearly 16, and an increase of solar power generation by a 
factor of 49.  
In 2012, countries with most renewable energy included China, United States, Brazil, Canada and Ger-
many. Germany leads in cumulative solar photovoltaic (PV) installed capacity, the U.S. leads in geothermal and 
biomass installed capacity; China leads in wind and Spain in solar thermal electric generation (STEG) (US 2012). 
The prices of wind and solar energy are falling, which has made these technologies increasingly competitive 
with conventional energy sources.  
Nevertheless, their penetration is still dependent on a robust policy environment (REN 2013). Feed-in 
tariffs (FiT) for renewable energy have been acknowledged as a useful policy tool because they guarantee 
independent power producers a fixed price of producing clean energy into the national electricity grid 
(UNEP 2012). Perhaps the most ambitious policy scheme has been set by Germany with the Energiewende, 
or energy transition, which seeks to promote the deployment of renewable energy technologies with multi-
ple measures in household, regional and national level. It is noteworthy, though, that an energy system 
                                                     
 
9  Even in terms of electricity generation, worldwide renewable energy accounts for only 23% (4,892 TWh) (US 
2012).  
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based on a large amount of renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind that have a low load factor, 
demands changes in energy infrastructure and technologies. Changes are needed to be able to control de-
mand (e.g. peak cutting), increasing focus is needed on storage capacity and transmission systems. In addi-
tion, more inclusive delivery structures could encourage energy self-sufficiency and reduce fossil fuel de-
pendence10. 
 
The lack of electricity in developing countries and an overview of different 
strategies 
Although the world energy profile is often depicted from the perspective of industrialised countries, at the 
same time, citizens and industries across developing countries severely suffer from the lack of energy ac-
cess, or the unreliability of electricity generation (cf. Figure 2.6). A large share of the developing world suf-
fers from energy poverty or the lack of access to modern energy services, which undermines health, educa-
tion, environmental quality and opportunities of economic empowerment. The United Nations experts 
have described energy as “the missing development goal” (Brew-Hammond 2012). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6. Access to electricity in emerging and developing economies (World Development Indicators 
2014). 
In the rural areas specifically, state-led electrification schemes as well as development projects have at-
tempted to tackle energy poverty. In this regard, the IIED (2013) suggests that a pro-poor approach to energy 
delivery modelling is beneficial. Useful tools for this purpose are participatory identification of ‘energy 
gaps’, stakeholder mapping, market and context analysis as well as the design of an appropriate delivery 
                                                     
 
10  Other suggestions include "smart grid" systems regionally to better control the balance between electricity produc-
tion and consumption, or even region- or continent-wide “supergrids”. 
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model and support services (ibid.). In addition to grid connections and improvements, also off-grid energy 
solutions such as the deployment of small-scale renewable energy have been tested in order to improve lo-
cal energy self-sufficiency. 
 
The market dilemma, climate change and energy policy 
In the light of current evidence, it seems that markets alone cannot steer the world into a safe climate path. 
Traditionally, markets have been governed with legislation and policies to minimise market externalities. 
Politics can shape markets and encourage technology change through a raft of measures such as stimulate 
the uptake of non-fossil fuel based energy generation at any given level – local, regional or international, or 
target the eradication of fossil fuel subsidies. A recent dramatic observation is the recognition of the poten-
tial of a future “carbon bubble”11. If fossil fuel resources would have to be left on the ground, this would 
signify that considerable investments made by large oil and gas companies into the exploration of fossil fuel 
resources would prove of no future value, and signify major losses to any shareholders. In order to prepare 
for such a scenario, a shift in public policy targets and the principles upon which energy investments have 
traditionally been based on would rapidly be needed.  
 
Box 2.2. Energy-related policy objectives across countries 
Objectives derived from environmental policy include the decreasing of CO2 emissions and promotion of 
renewable (or low-carbon) energies. The latter may also come from promoting domestic energy sources. 
Promotion of energy efficiency has an economic origin as a policy goal. However, energy policy has a list of 
other diverse objectives. Energy can also be considered as a mean to reach more primary objectives set in 
other policy fields such as industrial, economic, environmental, social, regional and even foreign policy. 
Typically, energy policy objectives at least target the securing of the availability of sufficient energy at rea-
sonable prices. Security of supply stems from national interests. Reasonable price, in turn, is a pure eco-
nomic objective. These kinds of energy-related policy objectives are repeated in almost all national energy 
policy documents by using different wordings. In practice, these policy objectives will be met – or not – 
with or without specific policy instruments. This formulates a framework for the market-based operations, 
and the market can be something between state-owned monopolies and fully open market. 
 
Conclusions 
Solving the energy dilemma is one of the major challenges of our century. Multiple data (see Scripps 2014) 
show that the level of carbon emissions is rising, and at an increasing rate, already passing the threshold of 
400 particles per million (ppm) (See Annex 1). Simultaneously, energy consumption, especially from fossil 
fuels, continues to increase. Importantly, the timeframe of change in energy infrastructure is considerable, 
typically decades or possibly a hundred years. This shapes the economic perspective and limits the ability to 
assume a straightforward approach to a radical transformation. The necessity of an energy transition seems 
                                                     
 
11  In referral to past experiences of economic bubbles such as financial, market, price or housing bubbles. 
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inevitable, which poses numerous questions in relation to how these energy investments are financed, what 
policy choices are appropriate, what kind of research and development (R&D) is needed, and how the 
rights of citizens are protected amidst such potentially large societal changes. 
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3. WHAT ARE ENERGY MODELS AND SCENARIOS? 
Energy modelling approaches: benefits and limitations 
In the energy sector, energy models have also been used as a basis for investment plans, legislation and reg-
ulation (Unger 2010). A model needs to be able to account for all of the factors affecting the system (Ryan 
and Sanquist 2012) to provide a useful schema of reality (See Figure 3.1). Models can be used for mapping or 
exploring, and are typically used for the aim of policy-making. Boumans (1999, 67) describes model making 
“like baking a cake without having a recipe”. Typically, energy models have been employed to depict the 
future energy demand and supply of a country or a region (Herbst et al. 2012). This chapter describes how 
energy models describe the energy system and how they bring authoritativeness to energy policy-related 
decision-making. In the next chapter, case studies further illustrate how energy-modelling exercises are 
closely linked with the evolvement of societal structures and the needs of the state machinery and economic 
life. At the end of the briefing report, a list of selected energy models is found (See Annex 2). 
 
 
Figure3.1. Schematic view of energy models (Unger 2010) 
Energy modelling in a historical perspective: an extension of neoclassical 
economics 
Energy models have been employed as tools to improve energy systems and energy infrastructure across 
industrialised countries. The emergence of macroeconomic energy models in the 1950s largely coincides 
with the need to develop the industrial economy. Detailed techno-economic models were then developed 
in the early 1970s as a response to the oil crisis (Herbst et al. 2012).  
Understandably, energy models have conventionally modelled the technical features of the energy sys-
tem, and in linkage with the national economy. Neo-classical economics and the modernisation theory 
dominated energy modelling assumptions in the 20th century (Luukkanen 1994). Still today, they have con-
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siderable normative influence. However, this fact (that the modelling of economic-energy structure is not 
embedded into considerations regarding a societal imperative to adapt to changes in the physical reality) is 
often not often made explicit. But energy models can also be understood as representations (Hacking 1983) 
of the energy sub-system, whose functions are embedded within a larger physical reality.  
 
Box 3.1. Modelling approaches and the fundamental role of assumptions 
Science is the first institution assumed to provide solutions to practical problems (Carrier 2004). Hacking 
(1983) suggests that science has two roles: intervening and representing. 
  Yet, there are multiple ways to think, work and adapt to the material world, as already noted by Aristotle 
who pondered how to abstract (Frigg and Hartmann 2012; Hacking 1999). Modelling provides one means 
of classifying and exhibiting information. Models are employed for evidence-based policy-making, and at 
times even tailored in the aid of public policy. Morrison (1999) even suggests that models are ‘autonomous 
agents’ that have functional independence in knowledge production. 
  Communication to decision-makers and citizens, or the “model clients” about the assumptions, practice 
and results that shape a model construct is fundamental because models can heavily influence their percep-
tions. When an energy model is constructed, several assumptions have to be made on the scope and struc-
ture of the model. Previous modelling experiments have shown that every model is “biased” by traditions 
and preconceived opinions from the model developer, the model user that updates and develops the model, 
and also the model client for whom the model results are intended (Unger 2010) The modeller's conception 
of the world and the theory the modeller has of the development of societies affects the selection of the 
system structure and the variables (Luukkanen 1994). These reflect differences in scientific paradigms, theo-
retical approaches as well as the model aims. There may also be considerable uncertainties even in im-
portant assumptions. 
  Different models can be seen to share features from several model classes (Luukkanen 1994). Models can 
be divided into cognitive models (improve knowledge of reality) and decisional models (help an institution 
make the best possible decision). Though in practice, both types influence perceptions. Mathematically, 
models can be static or dynamic; deterministic or stochastic; linear or non-linear; ergodic or externally con-
trolled. Computational methods can vary between network models, equilibrium models, optimization mod-
els – or system dynamic models. Also mathematical formulations in models may differ: some models are 
descriptive (simulating models), while others are normative (optimization models). 
 
Integrated assessment models (IAMs) as an alternative starting point 
An alternative starting point to energy modelling can be the employment of integrated assessment models 
(IAMs) that explicitly account for changes in the natural world. Integrated assessment models include phys-
ical and social processes to account for atmospheric composition, natural changes (climate and sea level), 
ecosystems, human activities, and economic aspects (Springer 2003). IAMs can also be used as a basis of 
considerations how to address climate change, and to derive costs of climate change mitigation and adapta-
tion. This logic was famously exemplified in the Stern review (Stern 2006). From the perspective of policy-
makers as model clients, rather than assuming a macroeconomic perspective in science that excludes natural 
scientific observations from the model, information of the physical reality, including climate change, can 
contextualise decisions in energy policy and the future energy system. As earth system models, the benefit 
of IAMs is their ability to describe simultaneously the natural science basis and the impacts of economic 
activity on the natural systems, which makes them useful tools for model-based learning. It must be noted, 
though, that a drawback of integrated assessment models is their breadth and complexity. Because of the 
24 
 
vast amount of data IAMs (are able to) merge to show the inter-linkages of different systemic connections, 
decision-makers and citizens may struggle to assess their limitations. Because the IAMs do not provide a 
detailed account of the qualities of the energy sub-system, bottom-up (engineering-based) and top-down (econ-
omy-based) energy models have been employed for this purpose (Grubb et al. 1993; Springer 2003; Proença 
and St. Aubyn 2009).  
 
 
Bottom-up energy models: the approach of natural scientists and engi-
neers 
In the modelling of the energy sub-system, bottom-up energy models, or partial equilibrium models, can be di-
vided into supply-side and demand-side models. Supply-side models such as EFOM (Finon 1979), MARKAL 
(Fishbone et al. 1981) and PRIMES (Capros et al. 1997) begin modelling by looking at electricity produc-
tion from different power plants, which is then matched with energy demand. In bottom-up modelling, 
energy demand is treated as given, which helps in the optimisation of the energy system. LEAP model 
(Heaps 2012) is an example of a demand-side model, which begins its modelling from the household-level (See 
4.2 for an example of bottom-up application of the LEAP model). Using historical data of energy con-
sumption and a micro-fit programme, LEAP can illustrate how energy consumption is dependent on the 
activity in different economic sectors12. In the accounting framework of LINDA (Luukkanen et al. 2012, 
24), the model user can input assumptions of future changes in economic sectors.  
Electricity market models which are able to show hourly, daily and seasonal variations (cf. Figure 3.2) have 
become increasingly relevant because of the significant changes of the electricity industry, including deregu-
lation and competition to improve economic efficiency (Ventosa et al. 2005). In the past, the operation and 
planning of the electricity sector was mainly simulated using cost minimisation model (Herbst et al. 2012). 
Also, if the future energy systems are based on increasing amounts of electricity generation from variable 
renewable energy (VRE), electricity market models will be increasingly relevant to energy modelling. Be-
cause of the intermittent nature of wind and solar, electricity market models can help in the optimisation of 
energy systems based on energy demand. 
 
                                                     
 
12  LEAP has also been employed as a ‘top-down’ energy model, for instance by ASEAN Centre For Energy. 
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Figure 3.2. Electricity market model: an example of seasonal use (adapted from Peev 2013) 
A bottom-up approach can also help in defining how different power plants (hydropower, coal and gas 
power plants) should adjust their power output as well as what kind of transmission capacity is needed from 
the electricity grid to match changes in electricity demand. These make bottom-up models useful in the 
backcasting of energy futures (See 3.2). For instance, when LINDA and LEAP models are used in scenario 
building, they acknowledge that the structural change of an economy also changes energy intensities sec-
torally. On the downside, bottom-up models often only exist on national scale; depict energy demand inde-
pendent of prices; and some mainly focus on representing the energy sector (Springer 2003). Also, long-
term scenario-building with bottom-up models is difficult due to the vast amount of auxiliary parameters 
needed in the modelling of future trends. To give an example, behavioural change has been difficult to 
model, even if an alteration in consumer preferences could increase or decrease energy consumption. 
 
 
Top-down energy models: the view of the public administration and econ-
omists 
Top-down energy models include computational general equilibrium (CGE) models, econometric models, input-
output models, and system dynamics models that treat the energy system as a part of the macro-economy 
(Herbst et al. 2012; Unger 2010). Top-down models aim for the optimisation, or an economic equilibrium, 
between supply and demand for energy. CGE models have been employed to analyse policy implications 
for economies, and have become a standard tool in many countries and international research organisations 
(Honkatukia 2013)13. In econometric modelling, economic theory, mathematics and statistical methods are 
combined (Herbst et al. 2012, 115) and energy is treated as an input to economic growth, and the typical 
variables of the macro-economy such as labour, capital and natural resources. 
                                                     
 
13  Herbst et al. (2012) mention GEM-E3 model of the European Commission, the GTAP model consortium, and 
the modelling work of the World Bank 
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According to critics, top-down models have been used for decision-making to produce forecasts, which 
have often consciously been pushed through or employed to oppose certain energy developments 
(Luukkanen 1994). These problems stem from the employment of neoclassical economic theory as the the-
oretical foundation to top-down energy modelling (cf. Box 3.2). While top-down models simultaneously fail 
to capture the opportunities of technological development (Unger 2010, 19), they also advocate a narrative, 
in which techno-rationalistic solutions inevitably seem like the only plausible approach to energy questions. 
 
Box 3.2. Values, rationalism and neoclassical economics in energy modelling 
A theoretical challenge related to practically all energy modelling is the approach of rationalistic thinking. 
The quantification of certain aspects of the qualitative properties of a system is difficult to express in con-
ventional models (Luukkanen 1994, 100-109). Rationalism manifests also in energy models that are derived 
from macroeconomic modelling. Many economic formulas are derived from rationalistic equations follow-
ing the idea of a homo oeconomicus, a self-interested individual who acts in the markets. The problem of neo-
classical economic theory is that it was developed at a time, when ecological limits received less emphasis in 
scientific practice. Contrary to the normative stance of ecologists or ecological economists, neoclassical 
economists ignore the fact that the economy is embedded in a broader reality. Therefore, models based on 
neoclassical theory may struggle to adapt to exogenous issues such as the increase of carbon emissions. 
  In top-down energy modelling, neoclassical economic theory is particularly influential. Macroeconomic model-
ling expects markets to assume the lowest technology cost and follow perfect rationality. Cost-benefit anal-
ysis assumes that income distribution, technology, market structure, entitlements, and consumer prefer-
ences are all structurally stable. Also, discounting is employed, following observations by economists, ac-
cording to which people value the present more than the future moment. In reality, though, macroeconom-
ic variables are subject to change (Luukkanen 1994). Furthermore, market rationality is merely one factor 
that guides citizens and institutions (Daly and Cobb 1994; Galbraith 1973; Kahneman 2011; Ostrom 1990). 
Another problem of cost-benefit analysis is that it assumes that "more is preferred to less", even if it may be 
difficult to know when is more really more (Swaney 1987, 1768; quoted in Luukkanen 1994). In turn, dis-
counting, which has been employed to estimate the costs of climate change in influential reports such as the 
2006 Stern review, is eventually a narrow framing to make decisions regarding the future of societies. 
  Nevertheless, even integrated assessment models (IAMs), as accounting frameworks, are underpinned by ra-
tionalism. In the case of IAMs, a major challenge to an exercise of what could be deemed as ‘appropriate or 
fair’ stems from moral considerations in trade-off situations. IAMs are formulated from parameters and 
units, but it is, for instance, merely impossible to weigh the value of economic growth against ecological 
values such as the survival of certain species. Even if certain estimates of the economic benefits of the natu-
ral world in addition to its intrinsic value can be recognised, it is difficult to assign living beings and biodi-
versity with exact values (Faith 2008; Stuart et al. 2010; TEEB 2010; Vermeulen and Koziell 2002)14.  
  Rationalism also penetrates other recent accounting approaches.Greenhouse gas accounting has already institu-
tionalised into national statistical bureaus in the 2000s. Schilgen (2013) proposes an altogether different ap-
proach, namely energy accounting. Energy accounting would calculate physically measurable amounts of com-
modities, goods and services. This would turn around the quantity theory – away from subjecting the ener-
gy system and the physical world to the aims of economic growth. In theory, energy accounting could re-
place or complement the role of monetary accounting. Interestingly, many countries already have con-
structed energy accounts because of the 1970s oil crisis (Lange 2003). 
  Accounting frameworks at least have certain value in themselves. Even if policy-makers are left with the 
responsibility of the final decisions, when trade-offs are noticed, a good model is able to make them under-
stood. 
 
                                                     
 
14  Scarcity of species is only one means of demonstrating the value of protection and preservation of natural life. 
Several traditions emphasize a responsibility of the preservation of other species. Recently, approaches emphasiz-
ing the benefits and services derived from ecosystems have been emphasized (see: TEEB 2010) 
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Bottom-up models indicate lower costs to climate change than top-down 
models 
Because of their flexibility, bottom-up models tend to indicate lower costs of climate change mitigation 
than top-down models (Unger 2010, 19). Bottom-up energy models typically include larger shares of re-
newable energy and low-fossil technologies, and in energy modelling this makes these technologies increas-
ingly competitive over a long-term period. In contrast, top-down energy models, which are based on histor-
ical data, suggest that society would have a low willingness of technological substitution. Top-down energy 
models present costs for technology change higher than bottom-up energy models, and following their log-
ic makes acting on climate change seem more difficult (ibid.). Problematically, public administration and 
economists have tended to rely on top-down models. Bottom-up models, in turn, have often been con-
structed and used by engineers, natural scientists and energy supply companies (Herbst et al. 2012, 113). 
Because top-down models are ineffective in assessing technological evolution to achieve a low-carbon 
economy (Proença and St. Aubyn 2009), this raises profound points of consideration with regard to climate 
change action. In the past, energy scenarios have mainly been constructed for the state and the energy in-
tensive industries (Luukkanen 1994; Midttun and Baumgartner 1986). Furthermore, top-down models have 
relatively straightforwardly assumed that with economic growth, also energy demand must continuously 
increase. This could have undermined views of alternative solutions to climate change to solve the dilemma 
of a fossil fuel-based energy system. 
While economy-led approaches have paid limited attention to the role of ecological limits, including 
climate change, top-down approaches also have certain problems from an economic perspective. Based on 
the economics of climate change, it makes sense to rather act sooner than later, because the costs of inac-
tion will only increase over time (Stern 2006). In addition, an aggregate view pays limited attention to any 
changes that may happen over time in the economic structure and sectoral energy intensities and downplays 
the significance of the household level perspective.  
 
 
Hybrid models and input-output models 
Hybrid energy models mix the bottom-up and the top-down approaches, and could improve understanding 
about and attempt to overcome limitations of both approaches. Hybrid models have emerged only recently, 
perhaps because of the lack of interdisciplinary research teams or necessary funding (Herbst et al. 2012). 
ADAM project in Switzerland is a recent example of a hybrid approach where a macroeconomic model 
(E3ME) was combined with bottom-up models from four final energy sectors (industry, residential sector, 
services, and transport) (ibid., 127).  
Input-output energy models provide more sectoral level detail than macroeconomic models. In input-output 
models, energy demand depends also on the changes in different economic sectors and industrial structure, 
not only GDP growth. However, input-output models are based on historical data, and unlike real econom-
ic systems that are dynamic, these models struggle to predict structural changes and the long-term future 
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(Herbst et al. 2012; Liang et al. 2010). Yet, an analysis of such impacts would be beneficial to the analysis of 
development trajectories of countries, especially in the developing world.  
System dynamics models such as TIMER- and POLES-models investigate long-term changes in the global 
energy system, including the impact of a renewables based energy system. 
 
Can models be misused? 
An energy model is only a tool meant to improve understanding of an underlying mechanism, the hypothe-
sis of the methodology and the validity of data. Ignoring a model's methodological limitations and going 
beyond its function as simply an aid to decision-making, this signifies the misuse of a model (Luukkanen 
1994, 186-191). Unfortunately, energy models have also been used to provide scientific justification for 
veiled political choices. A model should also not become more important than the modeller or the planner 
because often less complicated methods than modelling can be used. Actual dialogue between the model-
makers and the decision-makers is highly relevant (ibid.). For instance, if the results of a cost-benefit analy-
sis are given without an explanation of all the used assumptions and weighs, this means that the public is 
denied access to the full picture of the problem-framing (ibid.). Typically in the past, when econometric 
models have been applied, the negligence of these models of ecological impacts could have been hidden 
from the decision-maker. Models may also be developed by actors to promote their interests and/or 
worldview (ibid.). And while this is necessarily not a negative issue, such ideological foundations, as system-
atic codifications of cognitive and social structures (cf. Box 3.3), need to be made explicit. 
 
Box 3.3. Role of framing in decision-making and the framing effect 
Different framings of results may significantly influence the way they are interpreted by decision-makers. 
Behavioural economists criticize the assumptions of neoclassical economists and have demonstrated that 
psychological factors play an important part in human behaviour. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 
have worked extensively on heuristics, bias of decision-making and prospect theory. Framing effect refers to 
one type of cognitive bias, and proves that depending whether a choice is represented as a loss or a gain, 
people react differently. In 2002, Kahneman was awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics for the integration 
of psychological research into economic science, and human judgment and decision-making under uncer-
tainty. See also: Kahneman and Tversky (1971; 1974; 1979); Kahneman et al. (1982); Kahneman (2011). 
 
Benefits, drawbacks and limitations of energy modelling 
Energy modelling is considered useful because it is an efficient, feasible and necessary means of under-
standing complex systems. Different approaches to energy modelling can depict an overall picture of total 
energy demand and supply, and a consistent accounting of energy resources, including imported energy as 
they move through the production, transformation, inventory, and consumption phases of their life cycle to 
help determine lowest possible costs (Luukkanen 1994). Modelling can provide a basis for the discussion of 
the nature of the problem, and if the model assumptions are expressed in an understandable form, also 
comparisons between different approaches can be made and their validity discussed (ibid.). Bottom-up ap-
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proaches can provide an elaboration of needs at a localised level (household, community, or region) and 
more detailed analysis from an engineering perspective, whereas top-down models excel in providing an 
aggregate perspective and an economic-oriented view. 
The employment of energy models also has obvious drawbacks. Often times, the distinct structure and 
variables of the model actually limit the view of an overall problem. As more scientific understanding be-
comes available, models need to be improved or adjusted because science, rather than being definite or rig-
id, should reflect the best information currently available. Especially older energy models may be of limited 
use to answer contemporary or future challenges. In terms of their scope, energy models have mainly fo-
cused on the optimisation of suitable technologies. Also, the optimisation of cost efficiency has been held 
as the main assumption of comparability, based on certain assumptions on the development of current and 
future production costs (Luukkanen 1994). In turn, the valuation and measurement of ecological and social 
impacts has been rather limited. 
Conventional energy models also struggle to capture the significance of power relations of existing politi-
cal institutions in energy policy, or to represent the institutional links that exist between forecasting, plan-
ning and policy implementation (Midttun & Baumgartner 1986; quoted in Luukkanen 1994). Institutions 
work as filters by selecting and classifying information that goes into an energy model; and organisational 
structures and policy networks enable or limit public opportunities to participate in the decision-making 
process (Hay 2006; Sabatier 1993). For instance, the climate change-related policy goals of a Ministry of 
Environment may often be in conflict with the goals of a Ministry of Economy. Yet, many public admin-
istration officials – decision-makers and civil servants in key positions in relevant ministries – are econo-
mists who have been trained according to the paradigms of neoclassical economics. In turn, climate change 
and the necessity of an energy transition are only gradually becoming framed as economic gains. 
In many countries, the organisations involved in energy forecasting are strongly linked to specific in-
dustrial sectors producing and distributing energy. Paradoxically, present societal structures tend to support 
structures built based on historical needs, but most technological advances and new developments have 
benefited from state support, including R&D investment and market development, in the early stages. An-
other fundamental political limitation to energy modelling is the role of the already existing fossil fuel based 
energy infrastructure, which in itself is a disincentive in the markets for investments in low-carbon energy 
technologies15. Finally, energy choices of individual countries or regions are not only shaped by economic 
or ecological motives, but also security considerations and historic experiences (Helm 2011)16. Ultimately, 
all models have their limitations (cf. Table 3.1). 
  
                                                     
 
15  Many countries lack comprehensive policies for the strategic development of renewable energy (UNEP 2012) 
16  For instance, Poland is 95% dependent on coal, and values energy security based on domestic resources because 
trade relations and energy reliance with neighbouring countries, Germany and Russia, is difficult due to the burden 
of historic events (Helm 2011, 77) 
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Table 3.1. Summary of the limitations and benefits of energy modelling 
Limitations of energy modelling Benefits of energy modelling 
 Models and scenarios may be interpreted be-
yond their purpose as “truths” 
 Results may be communicated in a limited 
manner across sectors and groups 
 Often does not mention that energy modelling 
excludes impacts to the physical world 
 Neglects aspects that can’t be modelled 
 Top-down energy models may reduce com-
plexity too much 
 Has focused in the lowest cost assumption, 
which can legitimate narrowly framed deci-
sions, undermine the role of political sphere, 
democratic processes and cooperative patterns 
 In reality, political systems and decision-
makers are not rational 
 Challenge of modelling transboundary politics 
 May struggle to predict sudden changes or 
technological development 
 Reduces complexity 
 Can produce information for the aid of deci-
sion-making 
 Can help in determining the lowest possible 
option 
 Can give an overall picture of total demand as 
well as production facilities and can factor in 
imported energy.  
 Certain models also exhibit hourly and sea-
sonal variations 
 Could help in the exploration of different en-
ergy choices and policies 
 Is considered efficient, feasible and necessary 
 
 
In summary, the use of energy models in a planning process should always be based on a good com-
munication between modeller and decision-maker, and all assumptions, including theoretical choices and 
the limitations of the model need to be made explicit (Luukkanen 1994). Yet, in reality, is rarely the case, 
and dominant assumptions tend to prevail over emerging aspirations. Energy modelling is always limited by 
the boundaries of thinking as well as numerous political, societal and economic obstacles (See also: Schmidt 
2008). With models, one can get only a partial, and possibly biased representation of a complex reality, and 
most importantly, the two should never be confused (Luukkanen 1994). Most energy models are tools 
based on a positivist approach and its philosophical premises. Energy modellers might struggle in adequate 
interdisciplinary engagement within the scientific field, or in the communication of results across societal 
actors or sectors (transport, constructions, households).  
In the worst case, narrowly framed practices of energy modelling may end up legitimating decision-
making. Such decisions may struggle to gain acceptance of citizens whom inevitably have knowledge as well 
as versatile opinions about energy choices. While the model user can acknowledge some of these bounda-
ries with the adjustment of assumptions in the use of the energy model; the society as a whole can benefit 
when the challenge, limitations and different suggestions for energy solutions are made explicit. 
 
Energy scenarios 
Energy scenarios are used to assess the impacts of different developments under assumptions of certain 
outcomes. Scenarios should not be confused with policy prescriptions or the likelihood of outcomes, rather 
they can be used as an aid in the mapping of different energy futures. Based on energy models (read: chap-
ter above), different types of energy scenarios can be constructed, using the techniques of forecasting and 
backcasting. 
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Forecasting scenarios and the role of influential energy outlooks 
The first type of scenario prediction is based on the methodology of energy forecasting. Energy forecasting 
describes a series of events from the present state leading to a certain state of future, following prevailing 
trends of the society. Based on different assessments of the trends and by changing the parameters of the 
system, a series of possible states of future, or scenarios, can be described (Luukkanen 1994). Energy fore-
casting can be conducted based on quantitative data such as econometric models that mainly use historical 
data, or qualitative data such as expert interviews and Delphi method or market research. 
Energy outlooks that are based on forecasting can include a calculation of the most probable future to 
present policy-makers a business-as-usual case as well as display alternative scenarios17. An elaboration of 
different scenarios provides different framings and imagined futures what could happen, if there are chang-
es in certain key market variables (global energy demand, different fuels, trade, or investment) or political 
issues that force the energy system to adapt its functioning in a particular way. Therefore, risk and uncer-
tainty are central components of forecasting predictions. Forecasting scenarios feature in numerous influen-
tial policy publications such as IEA World Economic Outlook, BP Energy Outlook, Shell Energy Scenarios 
(cf. Table 3.2). The table below elaborates different predictions about future world primary energy demand, 
as suggested by the IEA, BP, Shell and the United Nations. 
 
Table 3.2. List of forecasting scenarios (adapted from Luukkanen et al. 2009) 
Forecasting scenario Main characteristics 
IEA World Energy Out-
look (IEA 2013) 
New Policies scenario: +3.6°C global warming trajectory: However, even with 
already adopted policies, energy-related emissions will rise 20% by 2035. 
IEA World Energy Out-
look (IEA 2012) 
1. New Policies scenario: +3.6°C global warming trajectory: Shift away from 
oil, coal (and, in some countries, nuclear) towards natural gas and renewables. 
China, India and the Middle East account for 60% of increase in energy de-
mand. 
2. Efficient World scenario: +3°C global warming trajectory. CO2 emissions 
and oil demand both peak by the year 2020. 
BP Energy Outlook 
2035 (BP 2014) 
Global energy trends: World primary energy consumption is 18 billion toe 
(2035). Main factors: limited sustainability efforts, new energy sources, efficiency 
improvements, and some progress in the area of energy security. 
Shell Energy Scenarios 
2050 (Shell 2008) 
World primary energy demand in 2050: 
1. Scramble scenario: Over 900 EJ. Main concerns: energy security and energy 
supply. Increasing energy demand met with coal, renewable energy and biofuels. 
2. Blueprints scenario: Under 800 EJ. Carbon price to give clean energy 
stimulus. Primary sources of energy: efficiency measures, coal and renewables. 
UN Global Environ-
mental Outlook (UN 
2008) 
World primary energy demand in 2050: 
1. Markets First scenario: Over 1 000 EJ.  
2. Policy First: 800-900 EJ. 
3. Security First: 800-900 EJ.  
4. Sustainability First: Around 600 EJ. 
                                                     
 
17  To read more about the assumptions of global energy scenarios, see e.g. Koljonen (2008) and Koljonen et al. 
(2008).  
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Econometric models, which assume an economic and technology perspective, have often been em-
ployed for forecasting. Market analysis and the prediction of energy prices are other concrete examples of 
the energy forecasting business that have considerable influence about energy-related decision-making (cf. 
Box 3.4). Yet, there are often large differences in the views of the different energy analysts, when they are 
predicting future energy prices such as the price of oil, gas, coal or renewable energy. Conservative or pro-
gressive views may also tell about the motives of energy forecasting and of the visions what could, or 
should be a plausible future. 
 
Box 3.4. How will the price of oil evolve? 
World politics has often influenced the price of oil and the energy market. Crude oil prices remained rela-
tively steady in the 1900s. A major spike was experienced in the 1970s with the oil crisis, and several coun-
tries sought measures to reduce their oil dependency. In the 1980s, the price of oil dropped again. In the 
2000s, the rise of oil prices has increased rapidly, as the war on Iraq and the Arab Spring have caused insta-
bility in the Middle East region. Production costs have also increased because of an increased difficulty to 
find easily accessible oil. In contrast, the production of oil and gas from unconventional resources brings 
higher costs. 
  Different energy reports can give highly varying projections on the future development of the price of oil. 
For instance, World Economic Outlook 2012 by the International Energy Agency predicts oil price to rise 
to USD 120 per barrel by 2020, and USD 125 per barrel by 2035. Yet, an OECD research paper, published 
in 2013, suggests that prices could go up to as high as between USD 150-270 only by 2020. Such an in-
crease could represent a ten-fold increase to the prices in the 1960s. Because empirical estimates of key 
driving parameters are highly uncertain, this results in a wide range of plausible future price paths.  
 
Sources: BP (2013), Fournier et al. (2013), IEA (2012) 
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The drawback of forecasting scenarios is that they can be affected by numerous biases. Another con-
sideration is the fact that even if business-as-usual scenarios do not necessarily equate with societal good, 
conservative scenarios may still become baselines to energy debate in the political sphere. Forecasting with 
the use of historical data may rather reinforce the status quo, rather than seek ways to address flaws in the 
energy system, as portrayed earlier. Modelling and forecasting do not only contribute to rational decision 
making, which is their alleged purpose, but also define reality, shape political debates. Forecasting can even 
legitimate political decisions and future investments in the profit for the modeller and exclude other devel-
opment paths (Luukkanen 1994).  
As discussed earlier (See: section about top-down energy models), the scenarios above tend to exercise 
scenario thinking from a perspective of cost optimisation. Another potential problem of energy outlooks 
and scenario-building is the dominance of forecasting outlooks by large energy policy actors that yield con-
siderable power. The views of the International Energy Agency (IEA) as an intergovernmental organisation, 
which analyses matters related to global primary energy and especially oil supply, are key to the formulation 
of national policies in the OECD states and of commercial policies adopted by industry (Miller 2011). 
However, the IEA was established in 1974 as a response to the 1973-74 oil crisis and initially to meet the 
needs of countries in that particular era. Large commercial actors in the energy industry such as BP and 
Shell, in turn, primarily follow the incentive of profit-making. Institutional settings restrain the filtration of 
ideas into energy forecasting, and many organisations are also bound by the constitutional mandates. 
Also, actual technological development may occur (and has occurred) differently to the predictions of 
forecasting models. A recent example is the relatively rapid fall in the production costs of solar panels, 
which has taken many energy experts by surprise. In Germany, supportive policies for renewable energy 
have considerably changed the national and regional energy landscape. Forecasting scenarios ignore or only 
narrowly discuss the significance of power relations in energy policy. In contrast to traditional energy fore-
casting, foresight methodology has been employed in futures studies to investigate longer-term develop-
ments and what alternative futures and development pathways could also emerge.  
Energy backcasting and low-carbon scenarios 
In energy backcasting (Box 3.5), the point of departure is a view of a possible and wanted future, which is ex-
pressed as a goal or a target. Contrary to forecasting scenarios, computation is conducted backwards – from 
the future to the present day – in order to reveal what different activities and steps are needed to reach the 
envisioned goal (Lovins 1977; Luukkanen 1994). As a normative approach to create future-oriented scenar-
ios, energy backcasting can be employed as a strategy tool under different assumptions and competing ob-
jectives. This way, backcasting can also reveal what obstacles there are to a certain future (ideal) state of 
being. Compared to forecasting, which predicts future based on the prevailing state of society, backcasting 
is “like playing with open cards, not hiding the policy preferences of the modeller” (Luukkanen 1994, 192).  
 
34 
 
Box 3.5. Six steps of energy backcasting 
J.B. Robinson, a developer of backcasting methodology, has identified six steps to backcasting:  
1. Policy goals and constraints are determined and specified;  
2. Description of current energy consumption and production is mapped;  
3. End-point as well as suitable mid-point dates of the analysis are chosen (usually 30-50 years in the future) 
4. The type of energy used and the efficiency of use are specified (including demand management 
measures and the costs of measures); 
5. Supply analysis; supply policy measures, and their costs are specified; 
6. An analysis of the social, environmental, economic, and technological implications of the scenarios is 
performed to assess the implications of the scenario.   
Source: Robinson 1982. 
 
Energy backcasting is closely policy-oriented as it explicitly focuses upon policy implications. This 
makes it useful for the optimisation of future energy demand. Typically, energy backcasting depicts a low-
demand society that seeks to conserve and minimise the use of non-renewable energy and other resources 
seeking to allow it to rely entirely, or very nearly, on renewable energy flows (Luukkanen 1994, 191). 
Luukkanen (ibid., 193) argues that energy backcasting allows the consideration of many factors, which are 
obscured in traditional energy supply and demand (economic equilibrium) forecasts.  
Due to the climate change threat, there is a need to explore different pathways to sustainability, and to-
day, the formulation of low-carbon scenarios using backcasting methodology is increasingly common18. To 
give an example of a backcasting scenario produced by a non-governmental organisation, Greenpeace has 
since 2005 published its Energy [R]evolutions series (Table 3.3). Examples of global energy backcasting scenar-
ios have also been recently produced by the IEA in the shape of the Blue Map scenario or 450 scenario. An 
example of a regional level scenario is the EU Energy Roadmap 2050 of the European Commission.  
Table 3.3. Samples of backcasting scenarios (IEA reports, Greenpeace 2012, EC) 
Backcasting scenario Main characteristics 
Energy [R]evolutions 
(Greenpeace 2012) 
Target: Low-carbon and zero-nuclear energy world future 
Pathway: No nuclear energy, no unconventional oil resources, efficiency gains, 
increase in electricity demand, large RE technology investment (1% of global 
GDP), creation of 12 million jobs. Primary energy consumption in 2050: 481 EJ. 
(N.B. A similar logic is applied in the country-level editions of the ER report.) 
450 scenario (IEA 2012) Target: Limit global temperature increase to 2°C and the concentration of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere to around 450 parts per million 
Pathway: Carbon pricing, removal of fossil-fuel subsidies, support for renewa-
bles and CCS, national policies for renewables and nuclear 
BLUE Map scenario 
(IEA 2010) 
Target: Least-cost means of halving CO2 emissions by 2050 
Pathway: Nuclear energy deployment: 32 large reactors annually until 2050 
EU Energy Roadmap 
2050  
Target: Least-cost means of halving CO2 emissions by 2050 
Pathway: Carbon pricing, efficiency, increase in electricity supply, major scal-
ing-up of renewable energy plus large changes in technology, networks, man-
agement, transport, et cetera 
                                                     
 
18  To assume an outcome-oriented perspective, in low-carbon scenarios a emissions limit is typically fed into the 
equation.  
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Backcasting scenarios that take into account scientific understanding about climate change can show that 
radical changes are needed in energy infrastructure from supply to demand. Basically all backcasting scenar-
ios indicate a future price on carbon, the eradication of fossil-fuel subsidies, a major scaling-up of renewa-
ble energy, and significant increases in energy efficiency. A shift away from fossil fuel energy also implies an 
increase of electricity supply of non-fossil fuel resources. Many low-carbon backcasting scenarios also de-
ploy nuclear energy as a part of the energy mix, aiming for high amounts of electricity and little carbon 
emissions. Yet, a vision of the widespread deployment of nuclear energy globally has also been criticised as 
techno-utopian. Noting the previously known risks, recently nuclear energy has lost popularity due to its 
costs and the change in public opinion as a result of the Fukushima incident19.  
Notably, most IEA or other influential backcasting scenarios take little stand on limiting energy de-
mand and changing consumer behaviour.A criticism of energy backcasting scenarios is that they mainly 
describe technology changes and assume costs such as estimates of the implications to the GDP; their as-
sessment of social, economic and market implications is more limited. Another challenge of backcasting 
scenarios, especially as alternatives to business-as-usual policy scenarios, is for them to achieve a credible 
and detailed vision to achieve policy relevance. Achieving a high level of detail in a backcasting model 
(elaborating changes and trends, including possible technological shifts demands skilled and detailed analy-
sis) demands resources from the producing institution, and particular skills in the drafting of alternative 
energy scenarios. Understandably, the production of forecasting scenarios or market research based on ex-
isting market energy system is somewhat easier, also because they are intuitively considered to be credible. 
What is the role of energy policy for sustainability? 
Scenarios should never be confused with energy policy-making. Backcasting scenarios are able to explore 
policy targets and how the energy system should change to enable a discussion about possible policy op-
tions. In turn, forecasting scenarios provide insight what may happen if current trends continue, or if certain 
factors push future trajectories towards a certain direction. Different scenarios can help decision-makers as 
they provide a range of scientific evidence and minimise uncertainty. The task of decision-makers, then, is 
to choose based on the best possible evidence and act – make responsible decisions as well as be critical of 
the nature of information, and of the premises upon which different “facts” are based.  
It should be noted that sometimes even the best possible knowledge and scenarios may fail in their vi-
sions or to anticipate changes. For instance, the global economic crisis since 2007 has changed the econom-
ic landscape to such an extent that forecasting and backcasting scenarios that do not take it into account are 
practically of little use today. What decision-makers should at least remember – as economists or non-
economists – is that in energy modelling the paradigm of neoclassical economics does remain dominant. 
This means that the evidence used to ‘evidence-based reasoning’ can be argued to suffer from a possible 
bias towards economic goals in the expense of ecological targets. In turn, information about climate change 
                                                     
 
19  World Energy Outlook 2011 explores a lower-nuclear case scenario that predicts a strong demand of natural gas and an 
increase in the use of fossil fuels. 
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has consistently accumulated to show a very high scientific certainty about climate change and its potential 
impacts (IPCC 2013; 2007; 2001). Fortunately, political decisions can shape both legislation and policies, 
and guide both markets and citizens towards more sustainable paths. Public policy can bind, enforce and 
incentivise actors of the society towards sustainability by using a multitude of options. 
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4. CASE STUDIES 
Towards low-carbon futures and openness in Finnish energy modelling 
and scenario-building  
Economy and energy landscape in Finland and its particularities 
During a few decades, the Finnish economic structure has considerably changed – from an industrial into a 
service-based economy. At the same time, the industrial structure has also changed; lighter industrial 
branches have employed more people than traditional energy intensive pulp and paper, base metal and 
chemical industries. This shift is also reflected in the number and even volume of industrial investments. 
The role of ICT has rapidly increased in the last two decades. In this change, the role of only one company, 
Nokia, has been significant. More recently, the search of further new innovations has been identified as an 
opportunity to transform the old economic structures. However, the uptake of cleantech solutions in Fin-
land has been fairly slow (Peura and Hyttinen 2011).  
Annual greenhouse gas emissions in Finland (see Figure 4.1) have altered following a change in eco-
nomic activities, but are also affected by the fluctuations in the availability of hydropower and the use of 
coal-fired condensing power plants. Finland has fulfilled its share in the EU Kyoto target, reducing GHG 
emissions to the 1990 level during the period 2008-2012. However, in some comparisons on climate policy, 
such as the Climate Change Performance Index CCPI, Finland performs fairly poorly when the country is com-
pared to other Nordic countries and the EU Member States (Burck et al, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Greenhouse gas emissions in Finland 1990–2013. Source: Statistics Finland (2014). 
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Energy consumption in Finland, measured either per capita or per unit of GDP, is one of the highest 
among industrial countries. Basic factors to explain this include a cold climate by geographical location in 
the North and an industrial structure, which still includes many energy intensive branches. Also, on average, 
the standard of living in Finland is relatively high, in a country, which is very sparsely populated. The frag-
mentation of regional structure and related long distances are also often referred to when the high level of 
energy consumption in Finland is explained. The Finnish energy mix (cf. Figure 4.2) is based on several 
energy sources. Nevertheless, two thirds from total primary energy supply is based on imported fossil fuels. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Primary energy supply in Finland by energy source 1920–2012. 
Nuclear energy and Mankala-principle 
Contrary to most European countries, Finland has planned to expand its nuclear capacity, which already 
includes four operating reactors in two different sites, Loviisa (Loviisa 1–2) and Olkiluoto (OL1–2). If a 
third Olkiluoto reactor (OL3) under construction will be completed, and two additional nuclear plant pro-
jects with a decision-in-principle granted by the Government in 2010 (Fennovoima and OL4) will be built 
in the planned schedule, the nuclear capacity in Finland could more than double by 2025. 
OL3 has been under construction since 2005. The OL3 reactor, a 1600 MWe EPR ordered by Te-
ollisuuden Voima (TVO) from Areva NP, created expectations of a “nuclear renaissance” because it was 
the first Western order since 1993. However, the OL3 has faced several difficulties from the very beginning 
of the project. Challenges are related to, for instance, (1) the quality of the base construction work and 
some materials, (2) process automation of the power plant and its safety systems, (3) implementation of the 
nuclear safety requirements set by the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), and (4) 
general management and coordination of the work with a large number of international subcontractors. 
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Steve Thomas has described the situation by saying: "The UK government asked me what they could learn 
from what went wrong at Olkiluoto and I said 'nothing because everything went wrong'." (Nuclear News 
2013). 
The original schedule suggested that OL3 would be in operation in 2009. In March 2014, the comple-
tion rate was still only at 82%, as informed by Areva NP in the company’s OL3 webpage. In 2012, TVO 
announced that the company is preparing to the possibility that this new unit may not start operating until 
2016. In December 2013, TVO requested a detailed schedule from Areva NP for completing the remaining 
work. At the time of the writing of this report, the schedule had not been provided and a new estimate of 
the timetable was still pending. Due to the considerable delay and the listed problems, the construction 
costs have heavily overrun the budget, and so far the estimates of the total cost of the project have in-
creased up to 8.5 billion euros. The turnkey contract of 3.2 billion euros is also subject of a dispute between 
Areva NP and TVO. 
Another Finnish nuclear project, Fennovoima, has also been widely debated in the media. This project, 
planned at Pyhäjoki in the north-western coast of Finland, will probably need a new decision-in-principle 
from the Government, because the type and size of the selected reactor are different from the granted deci-
sion-in-principle, and the shareholders of Fennovoima are now largely different from those in 2010. This is 
more of a political problem because the Government has changed after 2010, and the current Govern-
ment’s programme does not include new nuclear facilities. Moreover, the German E.ON has given up all 
business in Finland including Fennovoima, and the new reactor is supposed to be delivered by the Russian 
Rosatom. 
A typical Finnish power company delivers the produced electricity to its shareholders in relation to 
their ownership rates without making any profit. This kind of cooperation ensures the availability of elec-
tricity and enables sharing the economic risk of (large-scale) electricity production. This arrangement is 
known as the “Mankala-principle”, which is quite a unique characteristic of Finnish energy policy. Interest-
ingly, this principle probably also explains at least partly why capital-intensive nuclear power is still in a fa-
vorable position in Finland (Vehmas 2009). The name comes from a Supreme Administrative Court deci-
sion (1963), when a hydropower company Mankala Ltd. was not found guilty for distributing hidden dividends 
when the shareholder companies received the produced electricity against covering all fixed and variable 
costs, both in relation to their shares as stated in the articles of association of Mankala Ltd. After 1963, sim-
ilar companies (e.g. TVO) became very common in the Finnish electricity supply system. Companies oper-
ating under the Mankala-principle have invested not only in nuclear power but also in coal-fired condensing 
power and even in renewable energies such as wind power production. 
Lessons from the energy history in Finland 
Up to the 1960s, the Finnish energy supply was mainly based on renewable energy sources such as fuel-
wood, wood-based industrial fuels and hydropower. Since then, the consumption of oil increased very rap-
idly in the 1960s and early 1970s. The use of coal in separate electricity production and in CHP production 
has increased too, and natural gas and nuclear power were introduced in the 1970s. As reaction to the oil 
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shocks in the 1970s, the use of peat, a domestic fuel, was also increased. The use of renewable energies has 
been only modestly promoted when compared to other European countries (see Reiche 2005). Finland was 
a forerunner in introducing a CO2 tax in 1990, but thereafter, energy and environmental policies have not 
strongly favoured the use of renewable energies. On the other hand, wood-based energy has traditionally 
been used largely in the processes of the forest industry, and even peat has been classified as slowly renew-
ing biomass in Finland. Relatively large CHP production has been used as an example of high energy effi-
ciency, although CHP production is largely based on fossil fuels. 
The energy history in Finland shows that before the 1973 oil crisis, energy demand was assumed to in-
crease hand in hand with economic growth, and no specific energy demand estimates were made by the 
state administration. At that time public discussion, related to the building of big power plants, often re-
flected a wondering whether such large amounts of electricity would ever be needed, as was the case with 
the planning of Imatra hydropower plant in the 1920s and when the first nuclear facilities were discussed in 
the 1960s. Big power plants seemed to create a considerable overcapacity. Largely with state-supported in-
dustrialisation and the on-going rural electrification, industry and households needed to be lured into the 
use electricity (Myllyntaus 1991; Vehmas 2002). 
Later on, the 1970s oil crises led to the optimisation of certain low-hanging fruits in terms of efficiency 
in Western countries. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, four nuclear reactors were taken into use in Fin-
land. During that period the forest industry, key to Finnish economic success, invested significantly in elec-
tricity-intensive mechanical pulping, and electric heating was promoted actively as the heating system of 
new buildings. 
In a decomposition analysis of the drivers of the Finnish CO2 emissions from fuel combustion (Fig. 
4.3; see Annex 3 for the methodology) we can see that from 1971 to 2010, fuel switch to in the primary 
energy mix (factor CO2/TPES) has decreased CO2 emissions considerably. The shift to lower efficiency of 
the energy transformations processes (Factor TPES/FEC) has increased the emissions while the reduction 
of energy intensity of economic production (factor FEC/GDP) has reduced the emissions. The growth of 
GDP per capita (factor GDP/POP) has increased the emissions considerably. In addition, the population 
growth (factor POP) in Finland has slightly increased the emissions. To summarize, in Finland the growth 
of GDP per capita has been the main driver increasing energy demand while the decrease in energy intensi-
ty of production has been the main driver decreasing energy demand and CO2 emissions from fuel combus-
tion (cf. Figure 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3. Factors affecting CO2 emissions fro fule combustion (energy use) in Finland in different time 
periods. 
Out of renewable energy technologies, sustainable use of biomass has main interest 
Finland has a commitment to increase the use of renewable energy sources such as bioenergy, wind and 
solar energy up to 38% of total energy consumption as well as increase the use of transport biofuels by 
2020 fulfilling the Finnish share of the EU target (Lindroos et al. 2012). Bioenergy could have a significant 
potential especially in the rural areas (Peura and Hyttinen 2011). With significant forest resources in the 
European scale, the particularity of Finland is related to biomass. Therefore, bioenergy is planned to play a 
central role in meeting renewable energy targets. The pulp and paper industry has already begun the explo-
ration of new technologies around biomass as an energy source and sustainable forestry, such as biorefiner-
ies (Näyhä 2012).  
On a county level, there is interest for low-carbon solutions (Hinku 2014) because efficiency savings 
typically make economic sense. However, development in the use of other renewable energy technologies 
such as wind or solar has been slow (ibid.) due to lack of specific policy targets, active promotion policies 
and proper incentives for the potential users. In addition, especially wind energy has met nimby (not-in-my-
backyard) resistance, and arguments relate to noise and conservation of the archipelago area and landscape 
in general. In solar energy, Finland is one of only three EU countries with no policy target for electricity 
production by solar energy. Neither is its production statistically recorded. On the other hand, southern 
Finland where most of the population lives, receives a comparable amount of solar hours to Northern 
Germany and Denmark. Research polls, though, have usually shown that Finnish people are more support-
ive of renewable energy technologies than nuclear power (see e.g. Talouselämä 2014). 
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Box 4.1. How can the renewable energy sector in Finland be developed? 
According to the Finnish renewable energy business, high technology and educational skills could give Fin-
land a competitive advantage to make the country a forerunner in clean technology development. Never-
theless, in their view, despite the recognised potential of solar energy or biomass, the development of the 
renewable energy business has been slow (Peura and Hyttinen 2011). The business argues that most Gov-
ernment actions have mainly been reactions to the policy targets set by the European Union, rather than to 
have aimed to proactively develop and support the growth of the domestic industry.  
  In their view, the development of domestic RE markets, enabled by smart and supportive policies would 
likely increase demand for renewable energy (Auvinen 2014). In the past, lack of investment security and 
policy incentives have withheld consumer interest in RE technologies (Auvinen 2014). Small-scale produc-
ers in Finland have complained about the difficulty of permits, a rigid subsidy scheme as well as low aware-
ness of the economic, ecological and employment benefits of renewable energy.  
  One example is the production subsidy for small-scale producers to individually generate RE and sell it to 
the national electricity grid, which is granted to 100 kVA and bigger facilities only, which has excluded all 
household-size facilities from the subsidy. On the other hand, investment subsidy can be granted also to 
small-scale producers. In Germany, a lower limit for production subsidy has encouraged investments in RE 
technology and more citizens to view electricity generation from renewable sources in the as a business op-
portunity.  
Characteristics of Finnish energy policy 
Finnish energy policy is coordinated and largely prepared by the Energy Department of the Ministry of 
Economy and Employment (see: Box 4.2). Other ministries participate in the energy policy planning in en-
ergy-related sectors such as transport (Ministry of Transport and Communications); land-use planning, con-
struction, waste management and environmental permits (Ministry of the Environment); and biomass (Min-
istry of Agriculture and Forestry). 
The main energy policy goals are the promotion of renewable energy and energy efficiency, develop-
ment of energy markets, and securing the availability of energy at a reasonable price20. In Finnish energy 
policy, the European Union (EU) targets on greenhouse gas emissions, renewable energy and energy effi-
ciency have been influential. These policy initiatives have included the EU 2020 Climate and Energy targets, 
EU 2030 Framework for Climate and Energy, and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Targets 
for EU member states are binding, but individual countries are able to make their own more ambitious tar-
gets that can be more ambitious than the bottom-line set by the EU policies. 
Ryden (2010a) lists ten energy challenges in the Nordic countries: implementing the EU energy and 
climate policy (20/20/20 package), tapping into renewable energy, energy efficiency, making electricity CO2 
free, balancing between politics and markets, integrating electricity markets in the Northern Europe, district 
heating, changes in industrial structure, security of energy supply; and using energy models in an appropri-
ate manner. The International Energy Agency (See IEA 2013) has recommended Finland to pay attention 
to energy efficiency, particularly in the transport sector, and to develop the regional integration of the natu-
ral gas market.  
                                                     
 
20  In climate policy, Ministry of Economy and Employment has a shared responsibility with the Ministry of Envi-
ronment. The Ministry of Environment is responsible for EU and international climate negotiations, and the En-
ergy department of the Ministry of Economy and Employment coordinates the implementation of national climate 
policy with other ministries (Government of Finland, 2003). 
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Box 4.2. Civil society views of Finnish energy debates: the opening of energy policy 
Contrary perhaps to the Government’s view, where Finland is represented as a forerunner of climate 
change action; civil society groups, activists and also ordinary citizens have over the years been rather criti-
cal towards the way Finnish Government and the Ministry of Economy and Employment have prepared 
energy policy. Also the representatives of the renewable energy sector see that electricity production has 
mainly been a centralised playing field of big power plants and large companies, a well-working arrange-
ment where citizens have no role (Auvinen 2014). 
  In political studies, the decision-making culture of Finland has been described as corporatist and central-
ised. In climate and energy matters, environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have tended 
to see Finnish energy policy as cautious and hierarchical, and have noted how it has been based on close 
personal relationships between the Ministry of Economy and Employment, large energy companies and the 
energy-intensive industry. This has also been shown by researchers a long time ago (e.g. Ruostetsaari 1989). 
Different incidents over the recent years may exemplify that such claims are relevant even today: 
  Preparation of the Long-Term Climate and Energy Strategy. The first comprehensive Government strategy to 
steer the Government to reach towards climate change has been characterised described by some energy 
experts as a sensitive process. The Government prepared the National Energy and Climate Strategy, with 
technical support of the Ministry of Economy and Employment, and brought it for parliamentary debate. 
Civil society actors feel that this top-down process granted experts, civil society and citizens with very few 
entry points to join the debate to deliberate the assumptions that were taken in the Government policy (and 
the dominant parties). This closed approach could have made the eventual strategy more conservative than 
needed to be. 
  New permits for nuclear power. In 2010, the Government granted a decision-in-principle for two companies, 
TVO and Fennovoima, for constructing new nuclear facilities in spite of strong citizen opposition. Green-
peace sued the Government because it did not share the background documentation, including assump-
tions about energy demand that it had used as basis for decision-making with citizens. The Government 
eventually shared the documents – after the decision-in-principles were granted and public debate had 
ceased. 
  There was also speculation about possible disqualification of the Director of the Energy Department re-
garding his close ties to Outokumpu Ltd (one of the Fennovoima shareholders) and his central position in 
the preparation of decision-making. The conclusion made by Attorney General was that the Director was 
not disqualified. However, the documentation admits the double role of the Director and the possibility to 
risk the neutrality of decision-making, and highlights that similar double roles are not possible any more. 
End of cheap oil? In 2014, a NGO called Peak Oil Finland suggested that the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy are too limited in their scope of risk management and when estimating necessary changes in 
the economic structure. Referring to the possibility of an end of the so-called cheap oil, the Government 
was encouraged to diversify its energy options and better prepare itself for a possible future oil price hike. 
The organisation also encouraged the Government to reduce its reliance on IEA advocacy (Partanen et al. 
2014). 
  Energy as a cost factor for industry. In the past, the heavy industry has argued that low energy prices are needed 
to support ‘competitiveness’. However, typically energy costs make a small proportion of total costs in an 
industrial branch. Even in an energy intensive sector like the Finnish pulp and paper industry, energy costs 
alone do not determine investment decisions. Rather, raw material costs make a more significant share of 
the costs.  
Energy models and scenarios as a tool of Finnish energy policy 
In Finland, the Energy Department of the Ministry of Economy and Employment has quite a long tradition 
in providing energy scenarios in the preparation phase of Finnish energy policy. Other ministries responsi-
ble for relevant sectors are also involved by e.g. providing input and data for the scenarios. Scenarios are 
included in national climate and energy strategies, which have been used as a basis for more detailed policy-
making since the beginning of 1990s. The Energy Department was established in 1975 and quite soon 
started developing an energy model for preparation of energy policy in Finland. By using this model, the 
Department of Energy has produced energy scenarios for Finnish Energy Strategies published in 1991 and 
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1997 as well as long-term Climate and Energy Strategies published in 2001, 2005, 2008 and 2013. Typically 
each of these strategies is based on a baseline trend of energy consumption where individual alternatives in 
relation to a proposed policy or implementation of a planned investment (such as a nuclear power plant) 
are varied. Strictly speaking, a baseline scenario is the starting point, and other scenarios are constructed by 
varying selected elements of the baseline scenario. The most important scenario-specific assumptions are 
published within the strategy report, and more detailed assumptions can be found in the background re-
ports (the most recent one: National Climate and Energy Strategy, background report 2013). However, the 
model used for calculating the scenarios is not widely described. 
To the general public, the Energy Department’s energy model appears as a “black-box” model. Despite 
some requests, the Department has not in the past allowed any outsiders to use or even see the model. The 
Ministry has replied to the requests by arguing that the model is very complicated and difficult to use, and 
can therefore not be delivered even if requested. The Ministry has also stated that the energy model is not a 
public document (the type of document that typically must be available for the public). This indicates that 
the model includes confidential data, i.e. data on individual companies, for example. 
In 2009, the Prime Minister’s Office published a Foresight Report on Long-term Climate and Energy 
Policy (Prime Minister’s Office 2009). This report includes mostly qualitative scenarios, which cover many 
other sectors than energy. Finland Futures Research Centre facilitated the process of scenario construction 
(see Lauttamäki & Heinonen 2010) and Gaia Consulting provided the quantitative part to the above-
mentioned scenarios and analysed the economic, environmental, and social impacts (see Vanhanen et al, 
2010). All these scenarios were based on a target of 80% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by the year 
2050. Gaia Consulting analysed also the impacts of the Energy Vision 2050 provided by the Finnish Energy 
Industries (2009; see below) 
As a follow-up, Low-Carbon Finland 2050 -platform was introduced by state-owned research institutes 
operating in different sectors such as VTT (Technical Research Centre), VATT (Government Institute for 
Economic Research), METLA (Finnish Forest Research Institute) and GTK (Geological Survey of Fin-
land), coordinated by VTT. The platform has provided e.g. energy scenarios, which have the 80% reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions as a target (see VTT 2012). 
Traditionally, VTT and VATT have employed models in their energy-related research activities quite 
widely. VTT has used the Markal and Times energy models for constructing energy-related scenarios, and 
general equilibrium models Vattage and Verm have been developed by VATT (e.g. Honkatukia 2009; 
Honkatukia 2013). These models have been used to study macroeconomic and regional effects of different 
energy scenarios and policy applications, e.g. the economic impacts of using specific economic instruments 
of environmental and climate policies which cannot be dealt with the Ministry of Economy and Employ-
ment’s energy model used for scenario construction. 
The Finnish Energy Industries, which represents energy producers in Finland, has also provided their 
own national energy vision of a carbon neutral future for the year 2050. In this vision, reduction of CO2 
emissions is similar to the Prime Minister’s Office’s scenarios, but nuclear power plays a key role (see Finn-
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ish Energy Industries 2009). In an annex of the original Finnish version this report, also other scenarios 
provided by Finland Futures Research Centre (cf. Luukkanen et al 2009), have been included. 
Over the years, envisioning alternative energy futures against existing decision-making structures has not 
been easy. In the preparatory process more unconventional scenarios for the long-term periods up to the 
year 2050 have been proposed, but these have not really surfaced in the eventual outcome documents. Crit-
ics of the official energy scenarios in Finland have especially criticized the assumption of the continuous 
growth of energy consumption. Some scenarios have also been designed under assumptions to 
acknowledge the necessity of nuclear power. Such assumptions, assumed of the industry and its advocacy 
bodies, delimit and control the range of public debate. 
 
Box 4.3. Obstacles of model-based learning with alternative scenarios 
In 2007, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) commissioned an energy scenario for Finland (WWF 2007), in 
which primary energy demand needed to start falling by 2020, energy efficiency would have a major role, 
and also renewable energy was envisioned to play a significant part. The energy scenario raised interest, and 
energy experts involved in the scenario-building were asked to debate this scenario in universities and 
schools. 
  At this time, the EU 2020 climate targets had not yet been introduced and neither were the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme in place. What is more, this was the time when the heavy industry was planning on advo-
cacy for an increase of energy supply through nuclear power. The main economic newspaper (Kauppalehti) 
in Finland ran a front-page story, which suggested that the scenario calculations performed by the WWF 
expert group are wrong and misguided. 
  This case is an example of successful industry lobby, which “kills” the debate of alternative energy choices.
Economic and energy transformation are challenging the old industries 
Energy production based on renewable energy sources is becoming an increasingly recognised energy solu-
tion, which is slowly integrating into national policies. In a scenario, where also other renewable energy 
technologies than biomass, i.e. wind and solar energy, would play a more significant role in the Finnish en-
ergy system, also new elements are needed. The intermittent nature of solar and wind energies pose new 
challenges to the electricity system, including smart grids, demand-side management, regulation of demand 
by e.g. peak cutting, electricity storage, and improved battery technology. In addition to the development of 
new renewable energies, energy efficiency will continue play a major role, as transport, housing, construc-
tion and food, are all major CO2 sources of the Finnish economy. New renewable energies and energy effi-
ciency increase also energy self-sufficiency under a low-carbon scenario and decrease reliance on imported 
energy sources (Halme et al. 2014). Nuclear power, into which the Finnish economy has committed since 
decades, remains a controversial option for citizens, perceived as low-carbon for some, but a technology 
with high costs and risks as well.  
So far, transition of energy system towards sustainability has been focused on bioenergy and resulted of 
the policy development of the European Union. However, openness and participative working structures, 
stimulated by the digital revolution, are emerging trends of the Finnish political and economic life. This is 
also challenging past corporatist and centralised decision-making patterns. From a business perspective, a 
lack of domestic markets is an often-recognized problem of renewable energy technology development in 
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Finland, even if a strong domestic market for renewable energies would likely also improve the competi-
tiveness of Finnish companies in a growing international market (Lindroos et al. 2012). For new economic 
opportunities, the business model needs to be solid, and at an early stage, the infant industry would benefit 
from appropriate incentives. The strategic leveraging of technology skills through the Finnish engineer-
oriented educational system was a major factor behind the ICT revolution in Finland. Something similar 
could be expected also in relation to renewable energy technology, which is currently a largely export-
oriented industry in Finland.   
 
 
 A case of Thai energy planning with a household and alternative view  
The second case study of the report discusses the Thai energy planning and compares the Thailand Power 
Development Plan 2012–2030 (PDP2010: REVISION 3) and the assessment of it by Greasen and Greasen 
(2012) as well as how the Thai energy system has been analysed using ThaiLinda model (see discussion of 
the LINDA model in Luukkanen et al. 2012a). 
Thailand Power Development Plan 2010-2030 
Thailand Power Development Plan 2010 - 2030 (PDP2010), which is prepared periodically by the state‐
owned Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), was approved by the Nation Energy Policy 
Council (NEPC), and then endorsed by the Cabinet in 2011. According to the Plan, the PDP2010 themes 
focus on security and adequacy of power system along with the policies of the Ministry of Energy (MoEN) 
on the aspects of environment concern, energy efficiency and renewable energy promotion to be in line 
with the 15-Year Renewable Energy Development Plan (REDP 2008–2012). Parenthetically, cogeneration 
system was recognized to promote as the efficient electricity generation. 
According to the PDP in 2010, the recorded actual power demand (peak) of the country increased sig-
nificantly higher than the forecast and tended to grow continuously. Additionally, the new power plant con-
struction of Independent Power Producers (IPP) as plan has been delayed causing power system security to 
fall at risk influencing power reserve margin (RM) into the level of lower than the setting criteria or stand-
ards. Accordingly, the MoEN set a framework for a short-term urgent relief (2012–2019) by revising the 
power development plan (the PDP 2010) to be the one so-called PDP2010. 
According to the PDP the Cabinet called for an Alternative Energy Development Plan: AEDP 2012–
2021 and also 20-Year Energy Efficiency Development Plan 2011–2030 (EE Plan 2011–2030). It was seen 
that the scope of the new government policies and the variation of the economic situation induce changes 
and fluctuation in both power demand and power supply. It was said that therefore, to have clear vision on 
power supply acquiring, Thailand Power Development Plan 2010–2030 (PDP2010: Revision 3) was devel-
oped along the following issues: 
1) Forecasted power demand results which were approved by the Thailand Load Forecast Subcom-
mittee (TLFS) 2012 were adopted within frameworks as the following. 
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 Refer to the projected Thai Gross Domestic Products (GDP) and projected Gross Regional Prod-
ucts (GRP) estimated by the Office of National Economic and Social Development Board 
(NESDB), covering the economic stimulation policies and flooding effects at the end of 2011 
 Refer to the approved 20-Year Energy Efficiency Development Plan 2011–2030 (EE Plan 2011–
2030) proposed by the MoEN  
2) Alternative Energy Development were regarded according to Alternative Energy Development 
Plan: AEDP 2012–2021 to use renewable energy and alternative energy by 25 per cent instead of 
fossil fuels within the next 10 years. 
3) Energy supply security was taken into consideration of fuel diversification and suitable power re-
serve margin level. 
Critical assessment of the Thailand Power Development Plan 
According to Greasen and Greasen (2012), PDP is the master investment plan for power system develop-
ment. It determines what kind and what quantity of power plants get built, where and when. The PDP has 
wide-reaching implications, shaping not just the future of Thailand's electricity sector and its social and en-
vironmental landscape, but also that of Thailand's neighbouring countries. According to the criticism, the 
official PDP document reflects a planning process in crisis. By selecting excessive amounts of controversial, 
expensive, risky, and polluting power plants over cheaper, cleaner, and safer alternatives, the PDP is at odds 
with both Thai energy policy as well as the interests of the vast majority of Thai people. (Greasen and 
Greasen 2012) 
Greasen and Greasen (2012) call their plan simply “PDP 2012”, which they claim to be more consistent 
with Thai policy and the interests of Thai people than the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand’s 
(EGAT)’s most recent power development plan, the PDP 2010. The intention of Greasen and Greasen is 
not for the PDP 2012 to be the “only” PDP, but rather one to be considered in comparison to other plans. 
They hope that all candidate plans be presented to the public in a way that emphasize the values and as-
sumptions embedded in different future scenarios, and that ultimately an optimum PDP is selected that 
reflects excellent science, consistency with government policy objectives, and coherence with the desires of 
the Thai public. 
Greasen and Greasen (2012) claim that in previous years, “energy security” has been a trump card used 
to justify official government PDPs and to discount proposed alternatives without serious discussion. The 
Thai government energy policy guidelines stipulated in the Energy Industry Act do include the four dimen-
sions of energy security (Availability, Affordability, Energy and Economic Efficiency and Environmental 
Stewardship), but it is claimed that there has been little or no linkage between power sector planning prac-
tice and the multi-dimensions of “energy security” as enshrined by the law (see Box 4.4). 
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Box 4.4. Policy objectives for the power sector by Thai Government 
Energy security: procuring sufficient energy supply to meet demand 
Energy reliance: reduced dependency on imports 
Promotion of renewable energy: increasing renewable energy share 
Efficient use of energy: reducing energy intensity 
Diversifying fuel risks 
Reducing CO2 emissions 
Minimizing impacts from energy procurement 
Fair and reasonable costs of energy service to consumers 
 
Greasen and Greasen (2012) suggest to use a framework of indicators of the four dimensions of energy 
security to enable the comparison of the different Power Development Plans. Table 6.2 shows the pro-
posed indicator framework. 
Table 4.1. Indicator framework to assess energy security (Greasen and Greasen 2012). 
 
 
The proposed efficiency indicator does, however, not tell necessarily of the efficiency of the production 
because its value depends very much on the production structure in the country (the share of value added 
in different economic sectors). The production equipment and processes can be very energy efficient but if 
the production structure is energy intensive (e.g. lot of heavy industry) this indicator would show that the 
efficiency is low. This will be shown later with the scenarios in the Thai case (Base case and Industrial sce-
nario). 
One critic by Greasen and Greasen (2012) of the load forecast in the EGAT PDP is that it is based on 
GDP growth that is estimated to be too high. It is claimed that in the real GDP growth the “Black Swan” 
events have considerably decreased the growth e.g. in 1997, 2009 and 2011. It is claimed that such unex-
pected events, though hard to predict, are part of the reality of the economy and their effect has been to 
throw growth trajectory toward a path that has ended up being more linear or logistic-shaped than expo-
nentially growing. 
In practice, this type of claim includes the idea that the economic growth is continuously slowing down in the 
future – linear growth means that the annual percentage growth will be always smaller and smaller in the future. 
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The emphasis on the GDP growth and its form (linear or exponential) is, however, a little bit mislead-
ing in the energy analysis. The structure of economic growth is normally much more important for the en-
ergy demand, as will later be shown with the ThaiLinda model scenarios. 
The “Black Swan” events are problematic from the point of view of scenario building and planning. In practice 
they increase the unpredictability (stochasticity) of future development and this should lead to the increase in the 
reserve margin in the planning. Logically, if we think that, in most cases, the “Black Swan” events reduce the eco-
nomic growth, we should, however, increase the reserve margin in order to be on the safe side. 
Greasen and Greasen (2012) claim that what is needed is for Thailand is a move away from load fore-
casting based on econometric regression (top-down approach) and an investment instead in the capacity to 
undertake rigorous bottom-up forecasting that understands what the actual growth in electricity consump-
tion will be sector by sector, industry by industry, end use by end use. This is data intensive and requires 
much more detailed understanding of exactly how electricity is being used by all customer classes, and how 
these usage trends are affected by changing technology, appliance efficiency improvement rates, adoption 
rates, prices, domestic and international economic climate, and changing demographics. It is claimed that 
though a formidable task, user surveys and data gathering and analysis are likely to be a much better in-
vestment than mistakenly building unneeded power plants. Here we have to bear in mind, however, that 
when we try to construct a very comprehensive model the task of energy scenario building will be directed 
more and more to the very few energy experts who can understand the model structure and its use. This 
effectively reduces the possibilities for democratic use of the energy model and can be seen as a step to-
wards the model competition mentioned in chapters above. 
Demand Side Management (DSM) is seen by Greasen and Greasen (2012) as one important factor to 
improve energy efficiency. They say that the EGAT PDP 2010 did take into account savings from energy 
efficiency but the only program incorporated was the T5 light replacement program which is estimated to 
yield a savings of 0.3% of total load by 2030. This amount is extremely small compared to the real potential 
and to what has been done elsewhere in the world. The report refers to a study by Foran et al. (2010) which 
studies the energy efficiency improvement potential in households in Thailand for the main electricity con-
suming devices (refrigerator, air conditioning, fans, light bulbs, rice cookers) and results in considerable 
figures for saving potential.  
When thinking of the potential of reducing the demand by DSM or other energy saving measures we 
have to take into account possible rebound effects (Jackson 2009). The rebound effect can easily eat up part 
of the energy savings achieved through the reallocation of saved money to other activities which increase 
energy consumption. This should be taken into account in the planning process by trying to direct the ac-
tivities to low energy intensive consumption. 
When discussing of household energy consumption the changes in household incomes, behaviour, 
equipment that are used, their use intensity, et cetera have to be taken into account and this requires the use 
of energy models in order to coherently construct scenarios for future. The data intensive household mod-
elling normally requires large amount of survey data to be able to capture the many folded aspects of 
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household energy use. The LEAP model forms one usable framework for household energy modelling, 
even if the data requirements are considerable.  
Modelling household energy consumption with the LEAP model 
When we think of the household energy use modelling, we have to divide the households into suitable cate-
gories in order to be able to model them meaningfully. First, the division can be made between rural and 
urban households because their energy use profile is usually very different. The next division can be made 
between those households which have access to electricity grid and those without access, because also this 
has a considerable impact on energy use profiles. In some cases we have made a distinction within the non-
electrified between households between those which have access to road and those without access to road. 
Figure 4.4 indicates the categorisation of the households in one study in Laos. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Categorisation of the households in a study in Laos based on rural/urban and electrified/non-
electrified distinction. 
In addition to the distinction shown in Figure 4.4 it is important to make a distinction within these cat-
egories based on household income since also this has a determining impact on household energy use pro-
file. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show this division in the Lao case. 
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Figure 4.5. Allocation of the Vientiane households in different income categories. 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Allocation of rural non-electrified household with no access to road in different income catego-
ries. 
The allocation of households in different income categories is a dynamic process since the changes in 
GDP also change these allocations as households shift to higher (or lower) categories. In scenario building, 
these changes in the categories are one important part of the scenario construction. 
For each household income category we also need information of the electrical equipment and their us-
age. Figure 4.7 illustrates the information that is required for calculating the electricity use of different 
equipment in a household within a certain category. For scenario building we have to construct trends in 
the use of different equipment and their nominal consumption. The change in nominal consumption (pow-
52 
 
er kW in the Figure 4.7) is just one variable which has to be taken into account in the scenario building the 
others being the penetration of the equipment and the usage hours. These all change as a function of time 
and the scenarios have to be built based on these changes. To capture all these potential changes from 
household distributions to nominal consumption of different equipment and usage hours it is necessary to 
have a calculation framework to coherently carry out the changes in the scenario building process. The 
LEAP model provides a good framework for this type of bottom-up household energy modelling. 
 
 
Figure 4.7. Calculation of the electricity consumption of certain equipment within a household category. 
Studying Greasen and Greasen’s analysis 
Greasen and Greasen (2012) say that the opportunities for energy saving in industry and commercial build-
ings are much higher than in the residential sector. These savings opportunities are captured in the Thai 
Government's 20-year Energy Efficiency Development Plan, which targets an annual energy savings of 
nearly 70,000 GWh by the year 2030. Of this 70,000 GWh, the residential figure of about 19,000 
GWh/year is roughly commensurate with the projection for year 2026 by Foran et al. (2010). The criticized 
EGAT PDP2010 made no mention of the 20-year Energy Efficiency Development Plan because the latter 
was approved after the PDP2010 was issued. 
The political issues related to constraints in renewable energy development are quite difficult to take in-
to account in the modelling work. However, it is possible to create different scenarios with different as-
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sumptions of policy options and their impacts on renewable energy development. This means that normally 
it is not enough to create one scenario but you should develop alternative scenarios which take into account 
different aspects of the energy sector development. 
One important aspect that the Greasen and Greasen (2012) report emphasize is the potential role of 
cogeneration – not only in providing heat but also providing cooling. This has quite a large potential in the 
Thai case and should be analysed in more detail. Cogeneration provides good possibilities for energy saving 
since the overall production efficiency is much higher than in condensing power production due to the use 
of “waste” heat energy for heating or cooling. 
As was mentioned earlier the structure of economic development has a determining role in the future 
energy demand. Energy demand does not only depend on the growth of GDP but on the changes in the 
structure of GDP, i.e. the growth of different economic sectors and changes in their technologies. This is 
because the different economic sectors have considerably different energy intensities. Figure 4.8 shows the 
changes in historical sectoral energy intensities in Thailand and Figure 4.9 the changes in electricity intensi-
ty. The energy intensities within the sub-sectors of the economy vary even more and these should be taken 
into account in the modelling work if there is data available for the model construction. 
 
Figure 4.8. Sectoral energy intensities in Thailand. 
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Figure 4.9. Sectoral electricity intensities in Thailand. 
Alternative energy scenarios for Thailand 
Next, energy use related to some possible scenarios are shown in order to illustrate the impact of different 
drivers and their changes. The scenarios are produced with ThaiLinda model constructed by Jyrki 
Luukkanen (see Luukkanen 2012a). The LINDA model (Long-range INtegrated Development Analysis) is 
an easy to use Excel-based model, where the user gives the future annual sectoral growth rates and changes 
in energy intensities. Different modules describing e.g. the labour demand, details of industrial sub-sectors 
etc. can easily be added in order to make the model (accounting framework) more integrated. The model 
produces information of energy use and emissions in different scenarios. 
Base case scenario 
If we construct a base case scenario with the ThaiLinda model for Thailand with the GDP growth rates for 
different sector given in Table 4.2 we will end up with the scenarios indicated in Figures 4.10 and 4.12 – 
4.14 if the electricity intensities of the sectors change according to Figure 4.11. 
Table 4.2. Historical and future annual growth rates of value added in different economic sectors in Thai-
land according to the Base case scenario 
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Industry 11.6 % 8.5 % -0.1 % 4.0 % 7.3 % 3.7 % 4.0 % 3.5 % 2.5 %
Transportation, communication 9.8 % 8.5 % 2.5 % 7.4 % 2.6 % 1.1 % 3.0 % 3.5 % 3.0 %
Commercial 7.7 % 10.8 % -0.2 % 4.3 % 4.5 % 2.2 % 6.0 % 6.5 % 5.5 %
Total 8.4 % 8.5 % 0.5 % 4.6 % 5.1 % 3.2 % 4.9 % 4.8 % 4.0 %
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Figure 4.10. Value added in different sectors in Thailand in the Base case scenario. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11. Changes in the electricity intensity in Thailand in the Base case scenario. 
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Figure 4.12. Electricity use in different sectors in Thailand in the Base case scenario. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.13. Fuel use in Thailand in the Base case scenario. 
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Figure 4.14. CO2 emissions from fuel combustion in the Base case scenario. 
Industrial scenario 
In the industrial scenario the growth rates in the industrial sector are assumed to be higher than in the Base 
case scenario. The GDP growth rate is, however, same in this scenario in order to illustrate the differences 
resulting from different economic structure. The sectoral growth rates of the industrial scenario are given in 
Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3. Historical and future annual growth rates of value added in different economic sectors in Thai-
land in the industrial scenario. 
 
 
In the industrial scenario the total electricity consumption in 2030 is about 30 TWh higher (more than 
12 %) than in the Base case scenario requiring much larger production capacity. In the Industrial scenario 
the residential electricity consumption is assumed to be similar to the Base case scenario. 
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Mtons CO2 emissions in Thailand
Natural gas
LPG
Fuel oil
Coal
Oil products
Gasoline
Diesel
Agriculture 3.2 % -1.1 % 5.0 % -2.2 % 7.7 % 6.9 % 5.0 % 3.0 % 1.0 %
Industry 11.6 % 8.5 % -0.1 % 4.0 % 7.3 % 3.7 % 5.5 % 6.0 % 5.2 %
Transportation, communication 9.8 % 8.5 % 2.5 % 7.4 % 2.6 % 1.1 % 3.0 % 3.5 % 2.5 %
Commercial 7.7 % 10.8 % -0.2 % 4.3 % 4.5 % 2.2 % 4.7 % 4.3 % 3.5 %
Total 8.4 % 8.5 % 0.5 % 4.6 % 5.1 % 3.2 % 4.9 % 4.8 % 4.0 %
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Figure 4.15. Electricity consumption in the Industrial scenario in Thailand. 
In the Industrial scenario the fuel use (see Figure 4.16) would be higher than in the Base case scenario 
due to the increased power production and increased fuel demand in the industrial sector. 
 
 
Figure 4.16. Fuel use in the Industrial scenario in Thailand. 
Due to the increased fuel use also the CO2 emissions from fuel combustion would be 28 % higher in 
the Industrial scenario than in the Base case scenario (cf. Figures 4.14 and 4.17) 
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Figure 4.17. CO2 emissions from fuel combustion in the Industrial scenario. 
 
High growth scenario 
If we construct a scenario with higher GDP growth we can compare the inpacts on energy demand. Table 
4.4 shows the annual growth rates for the high growth scenario. In this scenario the GDP in 2030 is 27 % 
higher than in the Base case scenario (cf. Figures 4.10 and 4.18) 
Table 4.4. Historical and future annual growth rates of value added in different economic sectors in Thai-
land in the High growth scenario. 
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Figure 4.18. GDP growth in Thailand in the High growth scenario. 
The electricity consumption in the High growth scenario (Figure 4.19) is not much higher than in the 
Industrial scenario even though the GDP is 27 % higher due to the lighter (less energy intensive) produc-
tion structure. 
 
 
Figure 4.19. Electricity consumption in Thailand in the High growth scenario 
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Summary 
The Thai case and these scenario examples have been given to indicate the some impacts of changes in 
some variables in the energy-economic system. The Thai case signifies how different plans can have differ-
ent types of motives, aims and consequent weighs and that the benefits of energy-related planning can be 
assessed from multiple perspectives. The examination of assumptions in energy policy matters because 
without a proper understanding of expected benefits or drawbacks, it is difficult to assess and imagine en-
ergy policy alternatives and how they could be constructed. In contrast to top-down figures (see Chapter 
4.3 about energy use in Kenya), the use of LEAP model has been portrayed to illustrate the reader how 
bottom-up type of energy analysis can be employed to escape the dilemma of aggregation. Different scenar-
ios for Thailand were eventually provided based on historical and future sectoral growth figures, using the 
LINDA model where the user can make estimations about sectoral growth rates and changes in energy in-
tensities. Such features are useful in understanding of the energy system and the structure of the economy. 
 
Competing drivers of energy scenarios in Kenya 
In the final case study, Kenya and its potential energy futures have been discussed from the point of view 
of renewable energy, fossil fuel findings and access to energy. The case study exemplifies some of the chal-
lenges related to future energy choices and climate change. 
Factsheet: Economy and energy landscape in Kenya 
For Kenya’s population of almost 45 million, energy access is still low, at not more than 16% (World Bank 
2013). Wood fuel and other biomass account for 68% of total primary energy consumption. Most of energy 
in Kenya (petroleum and electricity) is consumed in manufacturing, commercial, transport, residential, 
power generation, and street lighting. Transport is the largest consumer of petroleum products followed by 
the manufacturing sector and other sectors (agriculture, tourism and power generation) (Institute of Eco-
nomic Affairs 2013). In 2011, total electricity consumption was 6,273.6 GWh. There has been consistent 
growth in demand for electricity in Kenya estimated at an average of 7% per annum over a decade (ibid.). 
Kenya imports both crude and refined petroleum products. 
At the same time, over half of the households in Kenya continue to use kerosene for lighting, and 60% 
of households use biomass for cooking, with especially the dependence on wood aggravating deforestation 
(Mugo and Gathui 2010). Less than 20% of Kenyan households, or approximately 1.5 million customers 
are connected on the electricity grid. Also, connectivity to electricity varies from region to region; whereas 
the capital area of Nairobi consumes over half of the energy (700 MW or 53.5% of total consumption), 
connectivity in other areas (Central 42.4%, North Eastern 14.5% and Western 14.7%) is low, and especially 
so in rural areas where access is less than 8% (ERC 2014). 
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Figure 4.20. Electricity production in Kenya per energy source (IEA database) 
The energy system in Kenya has operated through a national grid, which has covered only 25-30% of 
the country, with separate mini-grids also existing (KREP 2011, 5). The installed grid-connected electricity 
capacity is 1,741 MW, with a national peak demand recorded at 1,334 MW: 812 MW is a result of hydro-
power, 646 MW of thermal (fossil fuel), 251.8 MW of geothermal, 5.1 MW of wind, and 26MW from co-
generation (Kiva 2013)21. According to IEA statistics, about 5 % of electricity was imported up to 2006.  
In addition to the low supply, problems and challenges to solve are related to over-dependence on hy-
dropower with its unreliability of hydro-generation22; maintenance and the frequency of system losses, weak 
transmission and distribution network; system failures and transformer failures; vandalism of equipment; 
and high cost of rural electrification projects (GoK 2013; Kisero 2014). Low voltages are also contributing 
to energy tariffs, which are perceived as relatively high. Therefore, the national energy policy envisions to 
provide "affordable quality energy for all Kenyans" due to perceived high energy costs (up to 21 US cents 
per kWh), at least when the government compares its figures to countries like India and China where rates 
have been at approximately 6 US cents per kWh. 
Renewable energy in the Kenyan energy mix 
In Kenya, there is an impetus to develop renewable energy: geothermal power, wind, and solar energy with 
the assistance of public-private partnerships, World Bank and EU-support (see also UNEP 2012). Kenya 
expects to generate more geothermal power as well as gain smaller increases in generation capacity from 
                                                     
 
21  Installed capacity of mini-grids has accounted for less than 20 MW (Kiva 2013) 
22  Due to variations in hydrology and possibly accentuated by climate change 
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wind energy and solar energy (cf. Box 4.5). Feed-in tariffs have provided investment security and spread the 
decentralized production of renewable energy to encourage potential independent power producers (IPPs) 
to carry out feasibility studies on renewable energy generation, based on which to negotiate Power Purchase 
Agreements (PPAs) (WFC 2009; Gok 2012a; Kiva 2013). In Lake Turkana Wind Farm Project (310 MW), 
the largest single wind farm in sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya Power will buy the electricity generated at a fixed 
price over 20 years in accordance with a power purchase agreement (PPA) (Okoth 2013).  
 
Box 4.5. Government initiatives to develop the renewable energy sector in Kenya in 2000s 
 Feed-in Tariff Policy (2008; amendments in 2010 and 2012) 
 Wind Atlas developed in 2003; installation of Data Loggers and Wind Masts 
 Program for Solar PV installations in public institutions in Arid and Semi-Arid Land areas 
 Regulations for Solar Water Heating developed 
 Developed Solar Photo Voltaic Systems Regulations 
 Carrying out feasibility studies for small hydro power sites 
 Promotion of improved cook stoves  
 Establishment of Geothermal Development Company 
 Green Energy Facility to be set up to finance development of clean energy projects 
 
Source: SREP (2011) 
 
There is an estimated potential for 7 000 MW to 10 000 MW of geothermal energy; 3 000 MW to be 
generated with small-hydro generation (at the moment only 30 MW has been installed); and also potential 
for solar, wind, biomass and biogas generation are high (Institute of Economic Affairs 2013). Yet, there 
remain various challenges to develop the renewables sector. The high capital costs to develop the renewable 
sector are high for the state to consider them as budgetary requirements. In Lake Turkana, the costs are 
projected to reach up to 625 million € (or USD 800 million) and project implementation in a remote loca-
tion is not without challenges (LTWP 2014; Okoth 2013). Furthermore, to implement all earmarked geo-
thermal projects, Kenya may need to spend massively, according to press reports, up to USD 4.5 billion 
between 2014-2016, and to generate the targeted 5 000 MW by 2030, the country is reported to be lacking 
about USD 20 billion). Also, low awareness of opportunities and related economic benefits have con-
strained the uptake of RE technologies.  
The policy environment and ambitious future economic visions 
In Kenya, the energy sector was liberalised in the 1990s, creating semi-autonomous companies dealing sep-
arately with generation and supply, following a prevalent trend in developing countries. In 2003, Kenya also 
began to actively develop renewable energy (RE) sources, geothermal power as well as wind energy, and 
adopted its first Feed-in Tariff (FiT) policy in 2008 (with amendments in 2010 and 2012) (cf. Box 4.6). In 
geothermal energy, the government has set its own Geothermal Development Company to develop the 
sector. The process of devolving power to counties and a new constitution (2010) are making the country 
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review its national energy policy23. Other influential policies include the Least Cost Power Development 
Plan (LCPDP), Rural Electrification Master Plan. Also, Kenya published Kenya National Climate Change 
Response Strategy in 2010. 
 
Box 4.6. Strategic objectives in the Kenyan energy sector 
 Up-scaling power generation by increasing the capacity 
 Increasing access and connectivity to electricity and in particular increasing access in rural areas 
 Reducing power losses 
 Increasing use of new and renewable energy sources 
 Securing fossil fuel resources 
 
Source: Institute of Economic Affairs (2013) 
 
Simultaneously, under its economic blueprint Vision 2030, the government envisions large and ambi-
tious infrastructure projects for modernisation, to transform Kenya into a newly industrializing, “middle-
income country providing a high quality life to all its citizens” between 2008 and 2030 (cf. Box 4.6). The 
government is planning to radically raise the current electricity generation capacity, from 1 713 MW to 17 
000 MW by 2030 (Kiva 2013)24. It is seen that energy supply needs to supply increased energy for the use of 
manufacturing, agriculture, services, public facilities and households (GoK 2013). “Affordable, sustainable 
and reliable supply of energy” is seen to be able to stimulate high and sustained economic growth, which 
will catalyse higher incomes, increased employment and reduced poverty (Institute of Economic Affairs 
2013).  
Box 4.7. Scenario of growth in energy demand  
By 2017, to make electricity generation reach an expected 5,500 MW: renewable energy sources (geothermal 
1,646 MW; wind 630 MW; hydropower 24 MW; cogeneration 18 MW) are expected to contribute less than 
non-renewable resources (coal 1,920 MW, liquefied/compressed natural gas (LNG/CNG) 1,250 MW; diesel 
plants 250 MW). 
  By 2030, to reach an estimated a capacity of 15 000-18 000 MW, electricity is expected more from renewable 
energy sources (geothermal 5,110 MW; wind 2,036 MW; hydro 1,039 MW; others (Solar, MSW, Cogeneration 
3,000 MW) than non-renewable resources (thermal ie. fossil fuel 3,615 MW, coal 2,420 MW, imports 2,000 
MW). 
 
Sources: Kiva (2013); Government of Kenya (2013), Sambu (2014) 
Analysis of the drivers of energy demand and CO2 emissions 
The drivers of Kenyan energy demand have been analysed using decomposition analysis (see Annex 3). The 
results of the analysis are shown in Figure 4.21. The first component (CO2/TPES) indicates a shift to in-
creasing share of fossil fuel use between 1971–2010. The second component indicates slight decrease in the 
                                                     
 
23  In 2000s, Sessional Paper No.4 (2004) and Energy Act, No. 12 (2006) restructured the energy sector. Other key 
legislation has included the Geothermal Resources Act No. 12 (1982) and the Petroleum (Exploration and Produc-
tion) Act, Cap 308. 
24  The peak load is projected to grow to about 2,500MW by 2015 and 15,000 MW by 2030. To meet this demand, 
the projected installed capacity should increase gradually to 19,200 MW by 2030. 
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efficiency of the energy transformation process. The reduction in energy intensity of the economic produc-
tion (FEC/GDP) has decreased, to an extent, the energy use in Kenya while the growth in GDP per capita 
has increased the energy use. This factor has, however, been considerably low, and indicates almost no eco-
nomic growth per capita during the 40-year period (compare this with the Thai case in 4.2). The population 
growth in Kenya has been very fast increasing the energy demand considerably. 
In Kenya, the main driver for increase in energy demand has been the growth of population. The 
growth of GDP per capita has been very slow in Kenya during 1971-2010 having only a slight increasing 
impact on energy use. The energy intensity of economic production has had quite a small decreasing impact 
on energy demand. The planned industrial development can increase the GDP per capita in the future and 
it can also lead to more energy intensive production structure. The development of these two components 
is crucial for future energy demand in Kenya. 
 
Figure 4.21. Factors affecting CO2 emissions (and energy use) in Kenya in 1971–2010. 
Industrialisation aspirations gaining strength from new fossil fuel findings 
For long, Kenya had no known commercial petroleum reserves. Not until 2012, when oil was discovered in 
Northern Kenya, which soon attracted the interest of international investors. The government has been 
quick to react, and has set out to map its natural resources more in detail. Already the following year, in 
2013, a bilateral agreement was conducted between Kenya and China for the mapping of natural resources. 
Energy provision and ambitious infrastructure projects are becoming increasingly linked with talks of coal, 
gas-fired plants, and nuclear power plants. 
In order to develop the fossil fuel sector, government has identified as challenges the outdated refinery 
and pipeline system; inadequate storage infrastructure for strategic reserves of the petroleum products, vol-
atility of international crude oil prices, and weak legal and regulatory framework for energy resources explo-
ration, exploitation and development (GoK 2013). Development of the extractive industries would also 
increase energy demand heavily. Kenya Electricity Transmission Company (KETRACO), has already been 
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mandated to construct new transmission lines with government funding, is now involved with transmission 
lines of plans on coal-plants (Lamu and Kitui) and natural gas plants (Dongo Kundu in Mombasa). Despite 
an increasing interest in industrial activity, attention into improving and resourcing access to energy has 
been more limited given the largely unequal opportunities of access to energy. Fossil fuel discoveries are 
also making the government see its domestic resources to bring an reduction to the fuel bill, which in 2012 
stood at almost USD 4 billion to release finances available for other areas. Rising prices of petroleum prod-
ucts have fuelled inflation, pushing poverty levels up by making basic commodities more costly (Institute of 
Economic Affairs 2013). 
Lack of electricity access and unreliable grid as pertinent challenges 
The majority of people who rely on biomass and lack access to electricity are in the rural areas. Connecting 
households to the national grid is expensive and grid expansion can also be stalled due to land issues that 
are sensitive for local people. In 2013, the Kenya Power and Lighting Company (KPLC) announced that it 
is able to operate only on commercially viable connections. Because of the high costs of improving rural 
energy access, KPLC is deferring this responsibility to the state. In Kenya, this means mainly the Rural 
Electrification Agency (REA), established in 2006, which is responsible for providing power connections to 
rural Kenya (African Review 2012; Ayiebo 2011)25. 
Rural electrification has increased from 4% in 2003 to 22% in 2012, this has happened mainly in major 
economic centres and public institutions: trading centres, health centres and schools, following the agency’s 
(REA) Strategic Plan Phase I (2008-2012)26. Phase II (2013–2022) aims to triple the national electrification 
rate from 22% to 65% by 2022. Phase III (2022-2030) targets universal access by 2030 (Ayiebo 2011; Kiva 
2013). In the two coming decades, attention to the broadening of energy access now is supposed to be a 
priority for REA. 
An alternative to improve energy access, also in a more sustainable manner, is the introduction of re-
newable energy technologies at a household and village level. Under the 2nd Medium-Term Plan (2013–
2017), the government has initiated a pilot of eco-communities in eight counties. There remain certain ob-
stacles, though. A key problem related to the scaling up of renewable energy is financing arrangements that 
would enable citizens to buy such technologies. Equipment is rather costly, awareness limited, and interest 
rates provided by banks in Kenya perceived too high by the poorest and even the middle-class. In compari-
son to large-scale renewable energy schemes where the state is able to seek international loans from finan-
cial institutions such as the World Bank, neither companies nor consumers have access to such consumer-
scale financial mechanisms or supportive policies. 
                                                     
 
25  In the acceleration of electricity access, REA has listed nine potential drivers: lead in Government Commitment, 
lead in local funding, support from development partners, establishment of committed lead agencies, passion by 
stakeholders, community involvement, bulk purchase of materials, use of labour and transport contractors, and 
promotion of organized settlement (Ayiebo 2011) 
26  Access means households within 1.2km of M.V/L.V line (Ayiebo 2011) 
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One option would be the creation of institutions that enable to citizens or companies to buy the 
equipment through funding schemes with low interest rates and long payback periods. This is because con-
ventional institutions (banks, investors, existing state institutions) do not have mechanisms that would in-
centivize locals for RE and could wait for a longer return on their investment. Off-grid systems that would 
provide household-level systems of solar, wind or biogas, or cogeneration between these technologies, and 
related batteries are few, and mostly initiated through non-governmental organisations and development 
actors. 
Some areas of rural Kenya are especially vulnerable to marginalisation, including nomadic pastoralists. 
In the past, when government plans and development projects have been designed, this might have taken 
place without sufficient involvement of the locals, disadvantaging them (Anderson et al. 2012; IIED 2014). 
In spite of the will to expand energy supply, the enforcement of top-down development approaches and 
centralised systems may contradict peoples’ lifestyles, needs and priorities. Although an increasing amount 
of climate financing projects is to be implemented in the local level, this raises some concerns about the 
appropriateness of their governance frameworks. Without a careful consideration of the business models 
around these new technologies, there is a threat that externally-led projects exacerbate aid dependency in 
already marginalised areas (see also Anderson et al. 2012). 
Conclusions 
Under its economic vision, Kenya has taken a determined approach to develop its energy sector, also trying 
to learn from some resource-wealthy countries that have failed to benefit of their natural resources. In the 
past, interest in resource rents has been associated with fear, based on examples of economies in which re-
source use has had limited, or hindered, development outcomes (Sachs and Warner 2001). Understandably, 
developing countries view development to follow industrialisation. Following this logic, it seems that the 
Kenyan energy policy mainly derives from conventional macroeconomic models based on aggregate 
growth. Positively, electrification schemes have also sought to enhance local economic opportunities.  
In spite of its ambition, there are certain downsides of this strategy. Following the cost optimisation 
strategy, in 2013, the Government of Kenya, suspended the issuing of new licenses for renewable energy 
until 2017. An increasing interest to prioritise the fossil fuel industry development could jeopardize existing, 
relatively progressive policy arrangements and the interest to develop them further. Also, the growth of 
GDP does not equate with economic development. Another concern is related to the need to improve the 
quality of energy supply in Kenya, which is a recognised challenge. An interest in industrialising activities 
and related policies could also overlook the urge to develop access to electricity and its positive returns in 
terms of poverty reduction.  
Crucial aspects of an economic transformation include questions related to the structure of the econo-
my, what employment effects growth can create, and what education and skills are needed to harness those 
potential jobs. While Kenya is addressing to seek economic gains from its fossil-fuel resources and is un-
dergoing a review of its energy-related policies, the total economic assessment in terms of the amount of 
value addition and how it is divided locally is not yet known. Instead of a GDP-based assessment, a sector-
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based energy model, as provided for instance by the LEAP model, could better elaborate what sectoral 
linkages there are between energy supply and different economic activities (see 4.2). Some questions are 
also posed about the future demand predictions, and whether energy consumption will actually increase the 
way the government has projected. An article in Daily Nation in 2014 doubted current energy demand pro-
jections and stated that “electricity consumption in Kenya cannot possibly jump from the current 1,600MW 
to 5,000MW in 40 months” (Kisero 2014). This poses questions over the urge and timing to construct 
power plants. 
Developing countries, which typically import technology, have had limited participation in the clean-
tech sector. From a local business perspective, this makes the harnessing of such technologies locally lim-
ited. Especially in developing nations, commercial renewable energy industry is still in its infancy, and the 
electricity markets in developing parts of the world remain almost completely untapped (Makoni 2011). 
This could be addressed with the promotion of relevant skills; entrepreneurial culture; industry collabora-
tion; financial support; and supportive state policies. Problematically, some claim the power purchasing 
agreements (PPAs) for renewable energy to undermine government plans to reduce the price of power – a 
23% reduction is envisioned by 2017. Even so, relatively much has already been put underway in Kenya to 
scale up the renewable sector. This underlines the imperative to continue this work. In addition, Kenya, 
typically characterized as the driver of East African economy, tends to set a model for its neighbouring 
countries. This could also highlight possible spill-over effects for benchmarking and opportunities of re-
gional market development within the East African community (EAC).  
A broader question concerns the seemingly inevitable future “lock-in effect” to a carbon-intensive de-
velopment path not only in Kenya, but in all developing countries that are seeking to increase their energy 
supply. Ironically, a developing country like Kenya seems poised to increase its engagement in a fossil-fuel 
economy that will exacerbate climate change whose effects will likely most severely be felt in the Sub-
Saharan African region. While fossil fuel based economic activity can create economic output and may pro-
vide certain positive economic outcomes, climate change impacts will become increasingly visible in the 
medium- and long-term future. Such energy hcoices could also further undermine the national productivity 
in the agricultural sector, and of the global economy.  
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5. CIVIC ENGAGEMENT, DEMOCRACY AND  
 ACCESS TO ENERGY POLICY 
In energy policy, large oil and gas companies, owned by the state or international actors, have traditionally 
provided energy infrastructure. In certain regional energy initiatives, it may have been difficult for a single 
country to even plan for energy structure that could collectively benefit a range of stakeholders without the 
industry presence. This aggregate perspective has driven the implementation of large energy projects as well 
as top-down energy modelling. A reference to advanced mathematical and technical properties maybe used 
as an important political argument by groups possessing a model monopoly (Luukkanen 1994). Unfortu-
nately, this can also silence critical questions and challenges from groups that do not possess access to 
models. Therefore, citizens and civil society often have legitimate concerns of the bias of decision-makers 
towards the industry and their networks. Concerns of non-organised or marginalised groups or individual 
citizens with lesser advocacy skills and power may feel that their concerns are secondary to more influential 
advocacy networks and coalitions, and marginalised by the political system. 
 
Box 5.1. Think before counting – the ‘governmentality’ effect of calculations 
The notion of govermentality, or the art of government, emerges from Michel Foucault’s writings. Gov-
ernmentality refers to the organised practices through which subjects are governed through dominant dis-
courses and different ‘technologies’ (Foucault 1978; see: Burchell et al. 1991). When statistical information 
is connected to decision-making machinery, this information can become ‘a technology of power’, (Fou-
cault 1982, 1978).  
  Statistical information and quantification have brought “an avalanche of printed numbers” (Hacking 
1990). Using mathematical formulas, numbers are able to synthesise, summarise and visualise information 
that otherwise would be unattainable. Michel Foucault studied the knowledge of the state, and how it sub-
jects citizens under its decision-making. Albert Einstein famously noted that, “everything that can be 
counted does not necessarily count; everything that counts cannot necessarily be counted”. In science, this 
is recognised as the quantitative-qualitative divide. 
  In spite of the potential of technology, technocratic narratives can also undermine certain values that eco-
nomic models struggle to quantify, including culture, heritage, human rights or ecological diversity. Open 
data, which may bring new knowledge resources, is also bound to increase the penetration of numbers. In 
the digital era, organising information and presenting it in an understandable manner is even more im-
portant for both civic engagement and accountability. Sartori (2004) has demanded individuals and groups 
to think before counting; and to use logic in thinking. Foucault (1966), in turn, originally emphasised the signifi-
cance of the order of things. Foucault referred to the way issues and numbers are organised because it bears 
a major influence in how the world is presented to and perceived by the public. 
 
Public administration coordinates its expertise with particular language and technical terminology, 
which may also manifest as a potentially unconscious means of exclusion. An example in energy modelling 
is, when forecasting results are taken from their producers to wider public. Often times, an implicit trans-
formation from uncertainty to certainty takes place, and the results stand out as authoritative in spite of 
ambiguous data, elasticities that are difficult to estimate, ceteris paribus assumptions, and so on (Luukkanen 
1994, 180-191). Reality may soon be defined as the situation represented by the models instead of the lived 
reality of those who are directly concerned with a political choice (ibid.). Conflicts and arguments are easily 
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shifted from the political to the technical field and so the discussion of problems is limited to those who are 
fluent in this technical discourse (ibid.).  
Authoritative institutions and their policy-networks that inform decision-making (Sabatier 1998; Saba-
tier and Jenkins-Smith 1999) can undermine the opportunity of weak actors to contribute to knowledge 
production. Making alternative views heard can be difficult, and in setting terms in energy policy, the indus-
try often has had an upper hand. Representatives of established industries might arrange frequent meetings 
with ministry officials, which may impose a psychological bias of their stronger voice. For smaller actors, the 
exercise of professional advocacy may be more unfamiliar. Even within the private sector, renewable energy 
companies compete against the advocacy resources of the fossil-fuel industry. In turn, scientific bodies with 
their vast knowledge resources may hesitate to assume an advocacy role, leaving their views unaccounted 
for, or undermined by competing needs. Notably, when non-governmental organisations construct their 
alternative models, they may be forced to adhere to baseline data and assumptions of the state and industry 
they would not necessarily want to endorse, but are unable to change. Civil servants, in their part, may ad-
here to economically motivated arguments and expect careful demonstrations of costs and benefits of al-
ternative solutions. The public administration holds considerable power in inviting certain experts for con-
sultations and hearings, and choosing not to hear other opinions. 
Opening the decision-making process with deliberative democracy 
The scepticism of citizens in political matters across countries has been interpreted as a criticism of the way 
political systems are designed. Therefore, complementary means of participation have been proposed to 
overcome this democracy deficit. According to John S. Dryzek (2000), the essence of democratic legitimacy 
is in the authentic deliberations on the part of those affected by a collective decision. Also, the deliberative 
turn has challenged established institutions and models of democracy (ibid.). This can also be considered 
true for energy policy. As long as there is little discussion about the guiding assumptions that shape energy 
policy, it seems that there is also little room for democracy.  
Although state institutions do have a focal role in public policy, institutionalist democracy theories have 
tended to overtly focus in the functionings of the state and rationalistic worldviews, to the detriment of 
ignoring the communicative aspects of public decision-making. However, in order to achieve its full poten-
tial, democracy should be reflexive in its questioning, transnational, dynamic in its openness to prosper for 
opportunities for democratization, critical of established power, and also emphasize issues of community, 
rights, equity (rather than self-interest) and ecological limits (see Dryzek 2000). Deliberative democracy al-
lows non-violent techniques of communication, verbal conflict and rhetoric to improve the quality of deci-
sion-making to strive for best possible arguments (ibid.). 
In the energy sector, one feasible step towards the enabling of democratic participation and a diversity 
of views could be the opening of all assumptions that guide energy policy and energy modelling. In this re-
gard, certain countries are already more advanced than others. Certain different scenarios and the key pa-
rameters of the energy model such as guiding assumptions, climate change, sectoral growth could be 
opened for citizens for them to discuss and evaluate the predictions. Participative practice could increase 
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awareness and opportunities for citizens in agenda-setting even if this does not yet guarantee a change in 
the outcome of decision-making. This could be organised with experts of discursive facilitation, open 
communication processes. Also, for instance, the Department of Energy and Climate Change in the United 
Kingdom organises large energy-related consultations and is involved in digital and social media platforms.  
Open government and big data: revolutionising the knowledge basis 
The availability to real-time data to anyone is becoming an increasingly vital tool for the government to im-
prove its operations and increase citizen participation and awareness in a world of online collaboration, par-
ticipation and open access. A vision of an open government (Lathrop and Ruma 2010; Tauberer 2010) is 
already re-imagining and re-shaping the relationship between citizens and their governments, especially at 
the local level (Goldstein and Dyson 2013). Open data is seen as a new defining feature of a state and an 
opportunity because the state has a large incentive to improve its knowledge resources for more informed 
decision-making. The buzzword of “big data” (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013; Schmarzo 2013) refers 
to the ability to crunch vast collections of information, analyse, and draw surprising conclusions from it27.  
However, civic participation into unleashing the potential of open data between electoral cycles is an 
essential element of the democracy potential of access to information. Therefore, in addition to a mere 
publishing of information, active networks are important for an equitable circulation of data (Peixoto 2013). 
Unfortunately, it has been already noted that the potential for mediation with open data is closely related to 
the political freedoms and civil rights in place. In the absence of free media, governments might publish 
data, which is irrelevant and does not advance accountability in essential matters28. Therefore, information 
must also be opened for it to be challenged and evaluated by experts as well as ordinary citizens. Essentially, 
open data is a potential tool of enlarging the sphere of evidence-based discussion to the broader civil socie-
ty. Also, the contesting of discourses is always necessary for a critical and constructive orientation towards 
better decisions. Only this way can open data genuinely spark innovation and drive efficiency and fulfil the 
potential of this information to drive change in the society. 
Conclusions 
Alternative scenario modelling under the precautionary principle could benefit societal risk management 
and complement the traditional administrator-citizen relationship. It has been argued that because democ-
racy, solidarity, development and global warming are linked, the task of science is to demonstrate those 
links and provide credible lessons and recipes for change to fellow citizens (Hirst 2002).The ministry in 
charge, on the state part, should ensure that citizens understand their ‘energy model’, the assumptions they 
follow and have the ability to question it. This demands appropriate communication and the facilitation of 
the participation of experts and citizens.  
                                                     
 
27  According to Mayer-Schönberger (2013), the so-called “big data” is expected to transform ways of thinking and 
change blueprints in economy, learning, politics and innovation 
28  Institutions themselves need to be participatory, and secondly, also a set of certain technical skills, hardly accessible 
for to most citizens, is required (Peixoto 2013) 
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Like experts and politicians, citizens also try to make informed judgments about energy policy. This in-
cludes questions about controversial energy issues such as fossil fuel dependence, the emergence of new 
technologies (carbon capture and storage, fracking), the question of nuclear energy, and so forth. In the 
past – and even if political science literature – citizens have been treated as passive subjects of decisions 
rather than actors whose interests and opinions form the basis of a legitimate democratic process.  
Because citizens have concerns about decisions influencing their lives and localities, this makes citizens 
important stakeholders in decision-making and “experts” of their own communities. Without the involve-
ment of citizens in major societal debates and concerns such as climate change, it may be difficult for the 
society to act decisively and collectively. In a deliberative approach to energy policy, new avenues and 
pathways may be provided through the openness of argumentation, an ability to listen, and the capability to 
challenge historical assumptions. An equal involvement of all stakeholders can enhance meeting this goal. 
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6. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
This briefing report has examined how energy models are constructed and the assumptions under which 
they operate. Energy models and scenarios may aid planning activity to analyse system, system controllabil-
ity and seek policy alternatives (Luukkanen 1994), but only when the transparency of assumptions and the 
limitations of models and scenarios are well understood. Problematically, in scenario-analysis forecasting 
techniques and economic-driven energy modelling have supported historical assumptions rather than at-
tempted to solve future challenges. Also, in the communication process with decision-makers, strong net-
works between the state and industry following the industrial era have prevailed to impose change re-
sistance into the political system.  
Consequently, the established ‘elites’ have been accused across countries of using forecasting to provide 
political legitimacy for traditional energy developments, with little regard to the informative and explorative 
aspects of forecasting. The energy establishments, in turn, have accused the ecological movement of unreal-
istic zero-growth and "soft" forecasts. These arguments reflect differences in worldviews, positioning and 
available information as well as the industry-driven nature of the energy sector. In energy policy, the voice 
of large energy companies has typically been louder than actors whom are endowed with more limited re-
sources. Citizens, in their part, rarely have similar awareness about the premises of energy policy, access to 
information, or entry points into energy-related decision-making to ensure its democratic nature.  
Future-oriented models can benefit political decision-making. Future-oriented models can assess the 
dynamics of the energy and economic system in the context of climate change, needs of particular groups 
and articulate what role behaviour change could play in future energy solutions. The decentralisation of en-
ergy systems and the liberalisation of energy markets have already lead to more diverse energy supply ap-
proaches across countries. However, policy-wise several changes are likely needed in order to transform 
societies into low-carbon paths. Because the mitigation of climate change is an intellectual as well as a polit-
ical challenge, institutional settings and decision-making systems need re-examination. A deeper under-
standing about present decision-making models and their limitations could enable the formulation of deci-
sions that openly acknowledge the need to adapt into a changing energy future. 
Key messages for alternative energy models and scenarios 
 Provide and reveal model assumptions clearly to citizens, not experts only. Rather than a 
neutral tool to help decision making, modelling wields power and the results obtained with the 
model are often decisively affected by the choice of variables. Assumptions behind the parameters 
that are decided when a study is commissioned highly shapes the produced energy scenarios. Ener-
gy models should express their level of detail and uncertainty, and also visualise data clearly and in 
an appropriate manner. Most energy scenarios endorse simultaneously the goals of economic 
growth and climate change mitigation, but do not elaborate how these goals might be in conflict 
with one another due to the present fossil fuel-based energy system. 
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 Energy scenarios can help thinking, but are not policy recommendations. By changing dif-
ferent parameters that influence the energy model, different scenarios can be sketched to map dif-
ferent future pathways. Most low-carbon energy scenarios are able to consider what could happen, 
if a price was put on carbon. Scenarios can aid decision-makers in the mapping of relevant parame-
ters, but they are not policy recommendations. Decision-makers ultimately make changes in poli-
cies, which is why advocacy matters. 
 Provide accountability with tangible issues and timelines through backcasting. Backcasting 
can envision a plausible future, the steps required to achieve this future and obstacles in the way to 
realise the vision. The more detailed and realistic this vision is made economically and in terms of 
policy changes, the more useful and credible it is as a discussion paper for policy-making. Energy 
models and scenarios can help in solving what decision-makers are seeking answers to, make prob-
lems comprehensible, and create meaningful dialogue. For instance, Energy [R]evolutions report series 
of Greenpeace has caught the attention of decision-makers and been publicly debated. 
 Recognize the limitations of top-down energy models and forecasting scenarios. Most en-
ergy models are not integrated assessment models (IAMs) that acknowledge the whole earth sys-
tem. Top-down energy modelling struggles to acknowledge ecological constraints or household-
level needs because it is based on a macroeconomic view that focuses on cost optimisation and a 
techno-rationalistic logic. Reference or business-as-usual scenarios that suggest increases in energy 
demand also assume that economic growth must follow increases in energy demand. Many influen-
tial energy outlooks such as those provided by International Energy Agency and British Petroleum 
endorse such values implicitly. This can mislead the decision-making process and drive them into 
seemingly pre-determined paths, even when alternative political choices can or should be proposed. 
 Open the energy model for the public, researchers and stakeholders. The promotion of 
transparency and openness in energy modelling also demands other modellers to follow the same 
principles. In certain countries, a comprehensive overview of the model construct and its assump-
tions is already provided. The opening of energy modelling also encourages model-based learning 
to a broader group of stakeholders, and can enhance the deliberative aspect in decision-making. 
 Emphasize the long-term impacts of decision-making. Long-term impacts of ecological, so-
cial and economic nature need to be made visible because short-term economic impacts are almost 
always measured. Because energy infrastructure is built for decades, long-term assessments can 
show a more relevant picture than short-term assessments. Cost-benefit analysis that measures 
short-term economic gains can lead to negative impacts in the long-term. Even if economists are 
allowed to debate about the specifics of an appropriate social discount rate, this is well elaborated 
in the Stern Report (2006).  
 Energy models may have limited interdisciplinary linkages. Energy models do not investigate 
in detail the key emitting sectors such as the transport, constructions or food sector. Energy mod-
els also have limited connection with urban planners, even if cities are major sources of CO2 emis-
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sions. Energy models also limitedly deal with normative issues such as political culture or dynamic 
issues such as consumer behaviour.  
 Consider also the likelihood of unlikely events and the possibility of random events. Cher-
nobyl and Fukushima disasters had a major impact in decision-making in energy policy across 
countries. What other “black swans”, unforeseen events could lie in energy-related decision-making 
that have not been considered? 
Key energy policy messages towards a low-carbon world 
 The absolute changes needed are vast, and needed fast. World is increasingly investing in fos-
sil-fuel infrastructure, while carbon emissions are growing at an unprecedented rate. This trajectory 
is unsustainable. IEA warned about a “lock-in effect” by 2017 already some years ago. Over 80 % 
of global energy consumption is fossil-fuel based, and around 75% of electricity production as well. 
From the climate change perspective, it is crucial to demonstrate the urgency and rate of change as 
well as the difference between absolute and relative figures. 
 Use country case studies to demonstrate necessary steps towards an energy transition. Pos-
itive examples can be found from Germany (Energiewende), the rise of solar industry (China), legisla-
tion changes (California in the U.S.), waste to energy solutions (Austria), the employment of mini-
hydro power plants with small environmental impacts (Chile), wind energy (Denmark), or the up-
take of electric cars (Norway). Also, it should be noted that individual policy approaches in differ-
ent countries do not exclude one another, but could rather prove complementary. 
 Outline a list of necessary policy changes and their potential benefits. The scaling up of the 
renewable energy sector needs market development and visionary thinking. The RE sector would 
likely benefit from a comprehensive and supportive policy framework to create stability for the in-
dustry and incentives for the consumers. Modelling and understanding the impacts of policy choic-
es beforehand as well as what obstacles need to be tackled is useful. 
 Connect visions with structural changes, timelines and responsibilities. Local politics brings 
abstract issues close to citizens and makes them visible in cities and counties. Across European 
countries, campaigns are calling cities and counties for carbon-neutrality, demanding them to initi-
ate an energy transition for a low- or no-carbon energy future. Visions can be made tangible in or-
der to help local areas achieve and seek ways through which they can collaborate or compete with 
one another. Counties and cities are leaders in many climate change initiatives because of potential 
economic gains and an employment effect locally. 
 Translate technical issues into common language. Bureaucratic language is an obstacle that 
can limit the ability of citizens to understand energy choices. For instance, notions such as public 
procurement or the technical details of energy choices are not a direct concern of citizens unless 
their actual significance is made understood. However, often these connections remain hidden. For 
instance, the creation of a coal-based power plant may seem like an appealing option before it is 
understood that in the long-term, fossil-fuel based energy generation can lead to other problems. 
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 Focus on market development. In Germany, the state has provided affordable low-interest loans 
with long payback periods for consumers, households and institutions to invest in renewable ener-
gy technologies as a part of Energiewende. In both developed and developing countries, the devel-
opment of the domestic renewable energy market is important. Renewable energy solutions could 
be incentivised through schemes set by the government to stimulate demand and to address the 
needs of the poorest. Marketing and the provision of support services are important to make new 
products familiar to future consumers. 
 Learn from past mistakes. In the past, countries failed in their renewable energy policy because 
of the uncertainty about future policies or costs. Feed-in tariffs (FiT) should be interpreted to signi-
fy only as the first policy step towards an energy transition. Predictability of the policy environment 
can safeguard investments into renewable energy and build trust for the renewable energy industry, 
surrounding industries and end-consumers.  
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ANNEX 1: CLIMATE CHANGE: CO2 CONCENTRA-
TIONS IN THE ATMOSPHERE 
 
 
Natural factors caused the carbon levels to fluctuate between 170ppm and 300ppm (parts per million) for 
over 800 000 years, as indicated by ice-core data. Source: Dome C 800,000-year record: European Project 
for Ice Coring in Antarctica (EPICA), D., M. Le Floch, B. Bereiter, T. Blunier, J.-M. Barnola, U. 
Siegenthaler, D. Raynaud, J. Jouzel, H. Fischer, K. Kawamura, and T.F. Stocker, Figure available at: 
http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/co2/ice_core_co2.html. 
 
  
Carbon dioxide (CO2) concentrations have increased rapidly, resulting from the use of fossil fuels in the 
world economy, rising above any previously measured levels. Source: IPCC (2013, 11-12, Figure SPM.1), 
Figure available at: http://www.climatechange2013.org/. 
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ANNEX 2: LIST OF ENERGY MODELS 
Adapted from Herbst et al. 2012 and Unger 2010. 
 
Model Characteristics and geographical area Used by 
Bottom-up energy models
Partial equilibrium models
 
POLES Prospective Outlook on Long-term Energy System model, by Enerdata, 
analyses the international energy markets based on a simulation 
process to react to international price changes, and technological 
and economic trends. POLES depicts 7 world regions, 11 sub-
regions, 32 countries, and 40 technologies of power, including the 
final energy sectors. In 2014, POLES published energy scenarios 
until the year 2035. 
European Commission, 
WEC 
WEM  World Energy Model is a mathematical model on a global and region-
al level. WEM can generate medium- and long-term sectoral and 
regional projections of energy demand and power generation. The 
model can also estimate investments, calculate CO2 content factors 
for coal, oil and gas for different sectors and regions as well as 
make demand projections for three scenarios.  
IEA 
PRIMES PRIMES consists of 11 sub-models (demand- and supply-side 
modules) and can analyse the impacts of carbon emission trading 
and of renewable and energy efficiency policies on energy markets. 
PRIMES can simulate market equilibrium for energy demand and 
supply up to 2030 within each of the EU Member States. Com-
pared to many other energy models, certain functions of PRIMES 
are not publicly documented. 
 
European Commission
Optimisation models
MARKAL MARKAL models the entire energy system (energy demand and 
supply) with a bottom-up, dynamic modelling approach, employed 
on a country level, regionally and globally. Global TIMES models 
the entire global energy system (stationary and transports). 
MARKAL-Nordic is applied for Nordic countries. The model can 
be used to identify a least-cost energy system with cost-effective 
responses to emissions restraints. 
Throughout in Western 
countries 
EFOM The Energy Flow Optimization Model is a supply-side energy model for 
energy forecasting that simulates/optimises primary energy re-
quirements and investments to meet a given energy demand. 
EFOM has been employed in Europe since the 1980s. 
Europe 
TIMES The Integrated MARKAL-EFOM System (TIMES) is an evolution of 
the MARKAL model with special features such as climate equa-
tions, commodity related variables, data decoupling, flexible pro-
cesses, flexible time periods, and process generality. Global TIMES 
models like TIMES Integrated Assessment Model (TIAM) include a full 
representation of the climate equations. 
European Commission
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MESSAGE Model for Energy Supply Strategy Alternatives and their General Environ-
mental Impact, developed by IIASA, can compute the evolution of 
the energy sector up to the year 2100. The model identifies socio-
economic and technological responses to energy challenges, and 
aggregates the world into 11 regions. 
European Commission, 
IPCC, WEC 
DIME Dispatch and Investment Model for Electricity markets in Europe model is a 
linear optimisation model for medium- and long-term forecasting 
of the European electricity generation market. DIME covers 13 
Central and Western European countries and 11 technologies. 
 
Europe 
Simulation models
LEAP Long range Energy Alternatives Planning System, developed at the 
Stockholm Environment Institute, is a widely-used software tool 
for energy policy analysis and climate change mitigation assess-
ment. LEAP can be employed both from a bottom-up (house-
holds) and a top-down (energy consumption, production and re-
source extraction in all sectors of an economy) approach. 
More than 190 countries, 
research institutions 
LINDA  
Wilmar 
Long-range INtegrated Development Analysis, developed by Finland 
Futures Research Centre, is an Excel-based model, where the user 
gives the future annual sectoral growth rates and changes in energy 
intensities. Different modules describe labour demand, details of 
industrial sub-sectors et cetera. LINDA model is an accounting 
framework to produce information of energy use and emissions in 
different scenarios. 
Lao PR, Thailand 
REEPS Residential End-Use Energy Planning System is a forecasting model of 
residential energy patterns capable to evaluate the impacts of a 
range of energy conservation measures (appliance installations, 
operating efficiencies, and utilization patterns for space heating, 
water heating, air conditioning, and cooking). 
 
United States 
Top-down energy models
Input-output models
EEA Environmental-Economic Accounting for Germany is provided from four 
topics: energy, raw material, emissions; private households and 
environment; transport and environment; and cross-section publi-
cations. The energetic input-output (I/O) analysis is used in the 
analysis of the energy sub-system. EEA is linked with the German 
national strategy for sustainable development and national sustain-
able development indicators. 
Germany 
UN IO United Nations Input-Output Table Compilation provides an analysis of 
industries and products. UN IO makes a breakdown of the pro-
duction account, the goods and services account, and the genera-
tion of income account. 
United Nations 
UN SEEA The System of Environmental-Economic Accounting (SEEA) sets interna-
tionally agreed concepts, definitions, accounting rules and tables 
for internationally comparable statistics on the relationship of envi-
ronment and the economy. Within SEEA, SEEA-Energy part ac-
counts for the energy sub-system. 
United Nations 
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Econometric models
E3ME E3ME is a macro-econometric model (employment, gross value
added, prices plus other economic, energy and environmental vari-
ables) that simulates GDP for all EU Member States. 
Cambridge Econometrics
NEMS National Energy Modelling System is a regional economic and energy 
model, which models the U.S. energy markets 25 years into the 
future. NEMS is used to produce the Annual Energy Outlook, by 
projecting the energy, economic, environmental, and security im-
pacts on the U.S. of alternative energy policies and different as-
sumptions about energy market. Major assumptions influencing 
energy markets include economic growth and oil prices. 
 
U.S. Department of En-
ergy 
CGE (Computable general equilibrium) models
GTAP Global Trade Analysis Project is a multi-region, multi-sector, comput-
able general equilibrium model that models the entire macro-
economy globally, based on input-output data. GTAP Consortium 
includes institutions such as ADB, European Commission, OECD, 
UNCTAD, World Bank and WTO 
Intergovernmental and 
research institutions 
GEM-E3 GEM-E3 simulates interactions of the economy, the energy sys-
tem, the environment and the macroeconomic effects of environ-
mental policies (taxes, standards, tradable permits). 
 
European Commission
System dynamics models
TIMER The IMAGE Energy Regional Model analyses long-term trends in en-
ergy demand and efficiency and investigates a possible transition 
towards renewable energy sources. TIMER is based on an earlier 
TIME (Targets IMage Energy) model of long-term structural devel-
opments within the worldwide energy system. 
The Netherlands 
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ANNEX 3. METHODOLOGY OF DECOMPOSITION 
ANALYSIS. 
Decomposition analysis of a change in CO2 emissions explains the underlying causes of change. The de-
composition approach for economic time series was introduced in the 1950s and from the 1980s. Decom-
position analysis has been applied to especially in the field of energy economics. In recent years, decompo-
sition analysis has been increasingly applied to explaining change in energy-related greenhouse gas emis-
sions such as CO2 emissions. 
The objective of decomposition analysis in this article is to divide an observed change in CO2 emissions 
into contributions of different factors of interest identified in Equation (1): 
 
POP
POP
GDP
GDP
FEC
FEC
TPES
TPES
COCO  22
(1) 
 
In Equation (1), CO2 refers to carbon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion, TPES is total primary en-
ergy supply, FEC is final energy consumption, GDP is real gross domestic product, and POP is the amount 
of population. The contributions of the factors on the right hand side of Equation (1) will be calculated as 
shown in Equations (2a-2e): 
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In Equations (2a-2e), parameters 1, 2, 3 and 4 refer to shares of corresponding joint effects (residu-
als) allocated to the two factors in each of the chained two-factor decompositions. Subscript 0 refers to the 
base year value and subscript t0 refers to a deduction of the base year value from the value at year t (target 
year). 
The effect of CO2/TPES refers to the contribution of the change in CO2 intensity of primary energy 
use to CO2 emissions. In practice, change in CO2 intensity is a result of several things. One of the most 
obvious is fuel switch, i.e. change from the use of one energy form to another with different carbon con-
tent (if any). Examples of significant switches include changes from fuels with a high carbon content such 
as coal or oil, to energy sources with a lower or zero carbon content such as nuclear power, renewables, or 
natural gas – and vice versa. 
The effect of TPES/FEC refers to the efficiency of the energy transformation system, i.e. efficiency in 
transforming primary energy into different energy carriers such as electricity or heat. This can be influenced 
by e.g. a switch from fuel use to electricity use, or vice versa, or technological changes in fuel combustion 
such as a shift from separate heat and electricity production to combined heat and power production 
(CHP) or vice versa. 
The effect of FEC/GDP refers to the energy intensity of the whole economy. This can be influenced 
by several factors, such as changes in the industrial structure from energy intensive to less energy intensive 
industrial branches, a shift from industrial production towards services in terms of GDP shares, or techno-
logical development inside energy-consuming fields of the economy. 
The effect of GDP/POP refers to the amount of economic activity per capita which is influenced by eco-
nomic growth and changes in the amount of population. 
The effect of POP refers to changes in the amount of population brought about by changing birth and 
death rates as well as changes in international migration. 
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